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Patent Auctions
by Michael Abramowicz*
In his famous paper advancing a prospect theory of patents, Edmund Kitch found
inspiration in, but quickly dismissed, a footnote authored by Yoram Barzel suggesting
that rights to inventions might be distributed through an auction mechanism. Kitch
maintained that the patent system itself achieves the benefit of an auction by giving
control over the inventive process at a relatively early stage. The patent system,
moreover, avoids the need for governmental officials in an auction regime to define
the boundaries of inventions that have not yet been created.
Patent auctions, however, may be more appealing if the auctions are for rights to
inventive fields, rather than to specific inventions. Indeed, an auction system may be
seen as an extreme version of the prospect theory approach, by allowing patents to be
issued at an earlier stage and with broader scope than is feasible in a conventional
patent system. Like prospects generally, auctions could help avoid the costs
associated with duplicative patent races and with inventing around existing patents.
An additional advantage of auctions is that variations in the design of the auction
mechanism can help respond to specific concerns about the prospect approach. For
example, an auction awarding a patent to the party that agrees to commit the most
resources to a particular technological field may alleviate concerns that the prospect
approach could stifle rather than stimulate innovation. Similarly, to mitigate
concerns about deadweight loss, the government could sponsor an auction in which
the field is awarded to the party that, in addition to paying a set amount of cash,
agrees to charge the lowest price or hold the patent for the shortest term.
The analysis, however, identifies a number of empirical uncertainties that together
provide an uneasy case for the status quo. A principal problem is that there exists a
fundamental tradeoff in auction design, between approaches that maximize the
auction winner’s incentive to develop inventions within the scope of the patent grant
and approaches that most effectively reduce deadweight loss. There is no guarantee
that the government would optimally resolve these tradeoffs ex ante. Although
governmental officials ex post could compare bids that offer combinations of
commitments to development and concessions on price, this approach too is prone to
error. The government also faces a daunting informational task in determining when
to hold a patent auction.
The danger of governmental errors suggests that if patent auctions are to have any
place in our innovation policy, they must avoid governmental discretion in
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PATENT AUCTIONS
determining when auctions should occur and in identifying the most attractive
bidders. An ambitious approach might be to use information markets to make both
such determinations, though it may be too early in the history of information markets
to assess whether they are up to the task. A more modest approach would allow
patentees to demand auctions that would provide additional patent scope, with the
caveat that a patentee would need to substantially outbid others to win such an
auction, and failing victory would be fined.
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INTRODUCTION

The government awards intellectual property rights based on a principle analogous to that
of first possession. The author who creates a literary work enjoys copyright protection, 1 the
entrepreneur who first uses an indication of origin receives a trademark, 2 and the first inventor of
a useful machine or process is entitled to apply for a patent. 3 This approach is not inevitable.
Other property rights initially conferred by the government are assigned by administrative fiat or
through auction. For example, the Federal Communications Commission decides who may use
some parts of the broadcast spectrum and auctions rights to other frequencies. 4 Commentators,
however, have paid virtually no attention to the possibility that intellectual property rights might
be auctioned. 5 In theory, the government could auction a particular class of intellectual property
rights encompassing copyrighted works, trademarks, or inventions yet to be created. 6 The winner
of such an auction would then have incentives to create intellectual property within the scope of
the right, without needing to worry that competition from third parties might make the
investments worthless.
This Article considers whether auctioning patent rights, instead of (or in addition to)
granting them to the first inventors, could accelerate innovation and improve efficiency. The
debate will turn on a variety of empirical considerations, many of which will be familiar from the

1

Under the Copyright Act, “Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
2
Under the Lanham Act, the term “trademark” includes “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . .
used by a person, or . . . which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
3
The Patent Act provides, “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
4
The most famous article urging a shift from the administrative approach to auctions is Ronald H. Coase, The Federal
Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959), which included a brief version of what would later be known as the
Coase Theorem. For a later analysis, see Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33
J.L. & E CON. 133 (1990).
5
A notable exception is Gideon Parchomovsky’s proposal for using auctions to distribute domain names. See Gideon
Parchomovsky, Trademarks, Domain Names, and Internal Auctions, 2001 U. ILL . L. REV. 211 (2001). No one appears to have
considered auctioning rights to genres of copyrighted works, and such broad copyrights would almost certainly be unattractive on
economic and free speech grounds. See Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related Doctrines,
M INN . L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 34-36) (explaining why a “super-copyright” regime would be problematic).
The possibility that the government might auction patent rights has received only two footnotes plus one sentence worth of
attention in the literature. See infra Part I.A-B.
6
The Patent and Trademark Office already defines various invention classifications through the U.S. Patent Classification
System. See, e.g., http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification/ (last visited July 12, 2005); see also 35 U.S.C. § 9 (authorizing the
classification system). A single patent conceivably might be classified in several classifications, however, and if rights to a
particular subclass were to be auctioned, more attention might need to be paid to careful definition of the scope of the subclass.
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debate on Edmund Kitch’s prospect theory of patent law, 7 which suggests that broad patents
should generally be granted after relatively little inventive accomplishment. 8 Critics of prospect
theory argue that prospects might harm innovation by muting competitive pressures 9 and
centralizing decisionmaking on which projects to pursue, 10 but proponents identify
countervailing considerations. 11 If patents are granted sufficiently early, they might lessen the
inefficiency associated with patent races, 12 as the certainty of being able to capitalize on any
successful research might lead an auction winner to invest more and earlier in research and
development. 13 Similarly, broader patents reduce inefficiencies associated with “inventing
around.”14

7

Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & E CON. 265 (1977).
Id. at 267 (emphasizing the issues of patent scope and early patent application and issuance).
9
For example, Robert Merges and Richard Nelson conclude:
Public policy, including patent law, ought to encourage inventive rivalry, and not hinder it. As the ‘race to invent’
models show, a rivalrous structure surely has its inefficiencies. But such a structure does tend to generate rapid
technological progress and seems a much better social bet than a regime where any one or a few organizations control
the development of any given technology.
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 908 (1990); see
also id. at 877 (“[W]e have little faith in the imagination and willingness of a ‘prospect’ holder to develop that prospect as
energetically or creatively as she would when engaged in competition.”). Mark Lemley insists that the empirical claim “that an
initial inventor is better suited to control research than the market is fundamentally an empirical one” and that the empirical
claims “has been tested and found wanting.” Mark Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129, 141 (2004). The ultimate question, however, is not simply whether an “initial inventor” will better control
research than competitive firms, but whether an early granting of an intellectual property right may lead to earlier invention.
There are strong theoretical reasons for believing that the answer is affirmative. See infra Part I.C (considering Professor Duffy’s
demonstration of how the reduction in competition associated with patent races may accelerate innovation).
10
See Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decision Architectures, VA . L. RE V. (forthcoming 2005) (arguing that
patents may harm innovation by centralizing decisionmaking, but acknowledging that centralized information may be useful in
some information contexts).
11
For an argument that centralized decisionmaking may reduce costs associated with duplication and delay, see Patrick Bolton &
Joseph Farrell, Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay, 98 J. POL . ECON. 803 (1990). Wu disputes the relevance of Bolton and
Farrell’s analysis for intellectual property, arguing that “the relative quickness of centralized decision-making structures . . .
seems less important in the intellectual property context.” Wu, supra note 10 (manuscript at 5 n.13). But in innovation as in tax,
timing is everything, since any feasible and potentially valuable invention presumably will be created someday. Bolton and
Farrell note that if two firms have equal costs, they may enter into what eventually will be a natural monopoly market
simultaneously, creating duplication, and if both have high costs, they may both wait, creating delay. Bolton & Farrell, supra, at
805. These problems exist as well in the intellectual property context, when two potential inventors have roughly equal chances
of winning a patent.
12
For overviews of the economics of patent races, see JEAN T IROLE, THE T HEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 394-414 (1988);
and Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. ECON. 1 (1980).
13
See infra Part II.A.2.a.
14
The Federal Circuit has embraced inventing around, insisting that it “is the stuff of which competition is made.” State Indus.,
Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Paul N. Katz & Robert R. Riddle, Designing Around a
United States Patent, 45 S. T EX. L. REV. 647, 649 (2004) (endorsing the Federal Circuit and claiming that designing around is
“one of the ways in which the patent system works to the advantage of the public”). Some commentators, however, have
emphasized the inefficiencies associated with inventing around. See, e.g., Lewis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A
Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. RE V. 1813, 1869 (1984) (recognizing that if the new invention adds no functionality, the expense of
creating it is wasted and the reward function of the patent system is dampened).
8
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Precisely the same arguments may be made about auctions, which will tend, for better or
worse, to reduce competition and centralize in the auction winner the power to coordinate
invention, particularly if the auction system facilitates broader patents than the current patent
system allows. 15 The possibility of auc tioning intellectual property rights may thus be seen as an
extreme version of prospect theory, although one might endorse an auction scheme and yet reject
a prospect approach to patent issuance. 16 This Article will not attempt a resolution of the difficult
empirical questions about the relative virtues of competition and centralized control in the
inventive process. The relative efficiency of an auction system versus a patent system, in any
event, depends on additional difficult empirical considerations. The goal of minimizing the
transactions costs associated with administering the system of innovation, 17 for example, also
might justify the patent system relative to an auction alternative. There are countervailing
considerations here too, though, because auctioning broad patents might eliminate many disputes
about the boundaries between inventions.
This Article thus will not claim that an auction system is necessarily superior to a patent
system. Indeed, it will identify some difficulties with establishing an auction system that likely
would make attempts to create an auction system inefficient, and that at least provide a case for
the status quo. The Article does, however, seek to make uneasy the conclusion that the existing
system granting rights to successful inventors necessarily dominates an auction approach. A
substantial literature considers whether the patent system is superior to the alternative of a
reward system, 18 but the literature ignores that there is a third possible strategy for encouraging
inventive activity, the granting of exclusive rights through auctions. The adoption of a full-

15

See infra text accompanying notes Error! Bookmark not defined.-106.
A prospecting approach may lead to patents being awarded with little assurance that the patentee will follow through and
develop the invention. See infra Part I.B. An auction approach can reduce this possibility by insisting that the auction bid include
at least a substantial cash payment. A patent auction may also reduce inefficient duplication more than a prospect approach by
allowing for broader property rights. See infra Part II.A.1. That is, one might reject a patent prospect system on the grounds that
its benefits are relatively small, yet embrace an auction system because, although it might impose greater costs, it also allows for
greater realization of benefits of the prospect theory.
17
See infra Part II.B.3.
18
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND . L. REV. 115 (2003); Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic
Analysis of Property Rights in Information: Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate Information,
and the Alternative of a Government-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP . MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301 (1998); Michael
Polanvyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV. ECON. STUD. 61 (1944); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual
Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 537-39 (2001). Conceivably, an auction system might be combined with a reward system,
in which the government sometimes might take exclusive rights it had previously granted in exchange for just compensation. The
reward system would thus be invoked only once the auction system had provided sufficient incentives for an auction winner to
generate (and perhaps commercialize) socially valuable inventions.
16
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fledged auction replacement for the patent system seems unlikely, but auctions might have some
place within the existing patent system. This Article will seek to describe the range of ways in
which patent auctions might work, and ultimately to identify a relatively modest use for auctions
in the patent system. In this modest proposal, no governmental involvement would be needed to
specify the scope of auctioned rights.
In an important recent article, John Duffy argues that the patent system functions in some
respects like an auction, in which a patent is awarded to one of the inventors who agree to start
racing earliest and thus implicitly consent to place the invention in the public domain first. 19 The
analogy highlights that a patent auction need not award a patent to the bidder who offers to make
the highest cash payment to the government. This Article will detail several different approaches
to designating the winners of patent auctions. A patent auction, for example, might award the
patent to the inventor who commits the most resources to research and development, 20 who
accepts the shortest patent term, 21 or who agrees to sell or license the patented invention for the
lowest amount of money. 22 A significant potential benefit of patent auctions is that prospective
inventors compete to offer as much as possible to the public, rather than solely to earn as much
as possible through monopoly pricing from the public. 23 One reason that patent auctions may
have received so little attention from scholars is that pure cash auctions might appear to be little
more than an inefficient tool for generating government revenue. Patent auctions may become
more attractive, however, once alternative forms for auction bids are considered.
A significant obstacle, however, remains: No single form of auction bid can capture the
social welfare that a prospective patentee expects to provide. The more the winning bidder offers
19

John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 476-80 (2004). Some earlier commentators
recognized the similarity between a patent race and an auction. See, e.g., Wolfgang Leininger, Escalation and Cooperation in
Conflict Situations, 33 J. CONFLICT RESOL . 231, 233 (1989) (analogizing a patent race to an “escalation” or “all pay” auction in
which all auction participants must pay but only the highest bidder wins). Duffy, however, appears to be the first commentator to
recognize that patent racers bid not only by committing a particular amount of money to research and development but also by
deciding when to commit that money.
20
See infra Part III.A.
21
See infra Part III.B.1 (considering and comparing patent term auctions and pure cash auctions).
22
Even where a patent might cover numerous products or services, a patent auction could approximate the low price approach by
awarding the patent to the bidder who agrees to accept the lowest fraction of typical patent damages, compulsory license rates, or
regulated prices. See infra text accompanying notes 167-170.
23
To the extent that the existing patent system functions as an implicit auction, it too may have this feature, as the winning
inventors are those who offer the shortest effective patent terms. See infra Part I.C. (discussing Professor Duffy’s insight).
Explicit price auctions, however, may be more efficient, because the last increment of monopoly pricing tends to be the most
socially costly. See infra text accompanying notes 155-161 (discussing the implications of an analysis by Ian Ayres and Paul
Klemperer). A slight price concession for a long patent term is likely more efficient than a large price concession for a short term,
if the two provide equal value to the bidders.
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in the form of a shorter patent term or a reduced price, for example, the less incentive the
patentee will have to develop inventions within the patent scope. At the limit, anyone could offer
a zero patent term or zero price and then do nothing to develop the patent. With a shortest patent
term or lowest price auction, then, the winning bidder would need to be required also to make
some commitment to developing the patented product. This might come in the form of a payment
to the government, or payment into a fund to be used only for future development costs. More
complex auction designs might require the government to choose the bidder who offers the
public the best overall package, considering variables such as patent term, price, payment to the
government, and commitment of mo ney to a development fund. 24 There is no obvious formula
for the government to use in comparing bid packages, however. 25 Whether the government
selects how it will weigh different components of a bid in advance or evaluates bid packages
case-by-case, it risks placing excessive weight on some goals of patent law (such as limiting
deadweight loss) at the expense of others (such as encouraging development of patented
inventions). This tradeoff between static efficiency is familiar to patent scholarship, 26 though in
the case of auctions, the concern is whether there will be enough incentives to invent after a
patent is issued.
The analysis proceeds as follows: Part I reviews past proposals that, in passing, have
noted the possibility of auctioning patent rights, as well as Duffy’s proposal and another proposal
integrating an auction mechanism into the patent system. A principal purpose of this Part is to
identify assumptions relaxation of which might strengthen the case for an auction system. Part II
then evaluates patent auctions, considering only cash auctions for blocking rights in particular
fields. The principal benefit of a patent auction is that it can allow for broader patent rights than
are feasible in the existing patent system. By reducing inefficient duplication, a patent auction
can increase a property right holder’s incentives to engage in inventive activity. Part III considers
the design of patent auctions. It shows that incentives to engage in inventive activity also can be
24

See infra Part IV.A.1.
The Article will consider how the government might seek to harness private information in comparing bids. If such approaches
could be perfected, the optimal approach might not be for the government to hold patent auctions, but for the government to hold
auctions that would give bidders incentives to define the optimal structure of patent law in particular technological fields. See
infra Part IV.A.2.
26
See, e.g., WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH , AND WELFARE : A T HEORETICAL T REATMENT OF T ECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE 76 (1969) (“[A] longer [patent] life increases invention and thus gives on balance a larger amount of output for a given
level of inputs. [But] a longer life means that the monopoly on information lasts longer and thus there are more losses from
inefficiencies associated with monopoly.”).
25
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promoted by an auction design specifically geared to that goal, and that patent auctions also
might be designed to minimize concerns about deadweight loss. Finally, Part IV considers
alternative proposals for implementing patent auctions and for overcoming the difficulty
associated with governmental selection of rights to auction. A set of admittedly immodest
proposals would use information markets to assess possible auctions or even to provide rights to
set innovation policy in a particular field. The more modest proposal is for patent scope auctions,
in which a patentee could call for an auction of expanded patent scope, but could win the auction
only by substantially outbidding competitors. With a sufficiently high markup demanded, a
patentee will have incentives to call for patent scope auctions only in situations in which
concerns about inefficient duplication of resources are particularly salient, thus making patent
auctions socially beneficial.
I.

A BRIEF INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF P ATENT AUCTIONS

This Part will provide an intellectual history of patent auctions. This history will be brief
for two reasons. First, no one has ever considered in more than a footnote whether it might be
useful to auction intellectual property rights rather than granting rights to their creators. Those
who casually imagined auctions presumably envisioned only auctions for particular innovations,
rather than auctions for technological fields. Because it is difficult to auction specific innovations
before they are developed, no one has viewed the possibility of an auction as anything other than
a heuristic device, and thus no one has explored the auction possibility. There is thus little history
to recount. Second, my purpose is analytical rather than historical. Instead of describing each of
the four articles that constitute the intellectual history, I will offer only the barest summary and
then identify a particular explicit or implicit assumption about the inventive process that
underlies the article’s position on patent auctions. Relaxing these assumptions entails a
recognition that because patents are limited in both time and technology, inventors can only
partly internalize the benefits of research and development and may thus have inadequate
incentives to research and develop patented products. Patent auctions may be able to provide for
broader property rights and more robust innovation incentives, though potentially at the cost of
greater deadweight loss.
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A. Barzel on the Optimal Timing of Innovations
In Optimal Timing of Innovations,27 Yoram Barzel argued that sometimes innovations
may be produced inefficiently early. Assume that there is some cost to a particular innovation.
Some private party will decide to produce the innovation once the net present value of the
innovation just exceeds zero, 28 i.e. once the rents that the private party can obtain from the
innovation will be just enough to offset the cost of producing it. The inventor will not wait until
later than that, because if the inventor does so, somebody else will have an economic incentive to
produce the innovation first. If the inventor could prevent others from producing the innovation
in the meantime, however, the inventor would have an incentive to wait. Assuming that the cost
of the innovation is constant and the demand for it will grow over time, 29 the inventor would be
better off delaying invention, and earning a normal rate of return on the funds that would be used
for the innovation in the interim. Intuitively, if there is some moment of invention that would
produce a positive rent for an inventor, then inventors will dissipate that rent by inventing earlier,
because no inventor owns a property right in determining when to invent.
In a footnote, Barzel suggested that this inefficiency could be overcome by granting
monopoly rights on innovations, for example through an auction. 30 The conclusion that invention
would be too early from a social perspective in the absence of such a grant, however, depended
on an assumption that Barzel made explicitly, 31 but acknowledged was “quite strong”32 : that the
inventor is able to appropriate the full social benefits of the invention. When society receives
benefits from an invention that do not accrue to the inventor, invention might occur too late, and
so, Barzel recognized, in the absence of property rights, the net effect of these opposing forces
was indeterminate. 33 Barzel’s argument thus identifies a countervailing consideration to what he
acknowledged as the conventional wisdom that there generally are insufficient incentives to
innovate. 34 The economic literature on intellectual property, however, suggests that this
27

Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 RE V. ECON. & STAT. 348 (1968).
Id. at 351. Zero is used here in the conventional economic sense of corresponding to a normal rate of return.
29
Id. at 349 (assumptions 1 and 3).
30
Id. at 352 n.11 (“A conceptual way to overcome this kind of misallocation is by granting (or by auctioning) monopoly rights
on potential innovations before resources are committed to the innovating activity.”).
31
Id. (assumption 4).
32
Id. at 350.
33
Id. at 355 tbl.2.
34
This is clear in the first sentence of his piece. See id. at 348 (“It is widely recognized that when innovators are unable to realize
28
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conventional wisdom is powerful, and that inventive activity generally produces significant
spillovers that patentees cannot capture. 35 That suggests that when a patent leads to delay in
completion of inventive activity, that delay should count as a social cost, rather than as a social
benefit.
This might at first appear to undermine Barzel’s footnote suggestion for granting rights
through auctions, but in fact it might suggest a benefit of auctions. In general, spillovers and
other forms of positive externalities exist when property rights are ill-defined. 36 Until a patent is
issued, no one has a property right in the underlying invention, and inventors will only be able to
capture a portion of the value of their efforts, for example if they are fortunate enough to win the
patent race. As a result, the total level of effort will be suboptimal. Providing property rights at
an earlier stage, for example through an auction, could allow inventors to capture a greater
proportion of the social benefits that their inventive activity creates, leading to greater investment
in research and development. Certainly this would be true if the auctioned property right is
granted sufficiently early and with sufficiently broad scope to eliminate spillovers.
Auctions thus might be justifiable, but the social calculus may be the exact opposite of
what Barzel’s analysis would appear to suggest. Auctions will be valuable to the extent that they
reduce spillovers and thus increase the overall level of inventive activity within the scope of the
property right, but there is a danger that because some spillovers will still exist, property rights
might lead to inefficient delays in inventive activity. The case for auctions will thus be strongest,
the greater the extent to which the auction helps consolidate property rights that would remain
fragmented in a traditional patent system. The patent system can leave property rights
fragmented across two dimensions: time, because the patent term is limited; and technology
space, because a particular patent in the existing system will ordinarily protect only one
particular means to solving a given problem, yet might provide information helpful to other
researchers and investors in a technology area. Parts I.B and I.C will use other works on patent
the full benefits generated by their innovations the profit motive may not provide an incentive strong enough for them to innovate
at the socially optimal rate.”).
35
For attempts to measure the extent of spillovers, see Timothy F. Bresnahan, Measuring the Spillovers from Technical Advance:
Mainframe Computers in Financial Services, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 742, 753 (1986); Edwin Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and
Patents: An Empirical Study, 91 ECON. J. 907 (1981); and M. Ishaq Nadiri, Innovations and Technological Spillovers (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4423, 1993).
36
See, e.g., Janusz A. Ordover, Economic Foundations and Considerations in Protecting Industrial and Intellectual Property, 53
ANTITRUST L.J. 503, 509 (1985) (noting that governmental research subsidies may be needed when stringent property rights are
not available to reduce the extent of inventive spillovers).
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auctions to consider these dimensions, respectively, before turning in Part I.D to a concern that
broad property rights inevitably would create, increases in consumer prices and thus deadweight
loss.
B. Kitch on Prospect Theory
Although Barzel’s footnote proposal for auctioning innovation rights was undeveloped,
Edmund Kitch seized upon it in announcing his seminal prospect theory of patent law, 37
acknowledging that his “ideas first crystallized in response to Barzel’s essay.”38 Barzel, Kitch
wrote, recognized that a claim system could prevent inefficiently rapid depletion of the common
pool of technological information. 39 “What Barzel did not realize,” Kitch wrote, “is that a patent
system can be such a claim system and, indeed, that it is a more sensible system than an auction
system would be.”40 Kitch backed up the claim that the patent system would be “more sensible”
with only a brief single footnote: “Because the patent creates private incentives for the
identification and definition of claims and puts the claim identification and the claim
development process in the same hands.”41 This must be among the most perceptive phrases in
law and economics, though we will see that the comparison between an auction system and a
patent prospect system is more complicated than Kitch allowed.
The patent system, Kitch argued, not only provides useful ex ante incentives, but also
provides benefits ex post. Among other virtues, the system “puts the patent owner in a position to
coordinate the search for technological and market enhancements of the patent’s value,”42
“lowers the cost for the owner of technological information of contracting with other firms
possessing complementary information and resources,”43 and “reduce[es] the amount of
duplicative investment in innovation.”44 Kitch’s article remains arguably the most important and
the most controversial in patent theory. A principal criticism is that the possibility of prospect

37

Kitch, supra note 7.
Id. at 265.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 265-66.
41
Id. at 266 n.4.
42
Id. at 276.
43
Id. at 277.
44
Id. at 278.
38
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patents will simply shift duplicative investment to the pre-patent stage. 45 Auctions provide a
potential antidote, because there is no sense in racing to invent if exclusive rights are to be (or
have been) distributed through auction. Auctions also may be responsive to a second criticism,
that even after patents are granted inventors will compete to improve patents, 46 if the property
rights granted through auction are sufficiently broad. Thus, while Kitch’s identification of ex
post benefits to property rights advance the case for auctions, the limits of a patent prospect’s
approach to providing those benefits might strengthen the case for auctions still more.
Despite the great deal of attention that Kitch’s analysis has received, there is one
assumption in his analysis that commentators appear to have ignored, and relaxing this
assumption can point both to an unappreciated benefit of the auction approach and to a subtle
risk. Kitch acknowledges that “[o]peration of the prospect function requires that the owner have
most of the present value of the inventio n for the investment period.”47 Kitch reasons that given a
five-year investment cycle, the then-seventeen-year term should “give the owner a large part of
the present value.”48 But if the inventor does not begin development right away, less of the patent
term would be left. Indeed, perhaps so little of the patent term will be remaining that the inventor
might well not develop the invention at all.
This might seem to be an implausible concern, for why would the inventor not begin
development right away? Barze l’s analysis, however, provides a partial answer: It might be in
the interest of the patentee, even if not in the social interest, to delay inventive activity. Even so,
why would an inventor have gone through the trouble to acquire a patent, only to later abandon
it? The simple answer is that the receipt of a patent provides the patentee with an option to
develop and commercialize the patent, but options often turn out to be not worth exercising. 49
Kitch might implicitly be assuming that the benefits and costs of commercializing a patent are
predictable in advance, but market conditions might change after a patent is issued. It thus
sometimes will make sense to patent an invention that seems likely to be worth commercializing
45

Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197
(1980).
46
See, e.g., Roger L. Beck, The Prospect Theory of the Patent System and Unproductive Competition, 5 RESEARCH L. & ECON.
193, 194 (1983).
47
Id. at 285.
48
Id.
49
For a more detailed version of this argument, see Michael Abramowicz, The Problem of Patent Underdevelopment (2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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only in the last years of a patent term, or even that seems unlikely to be worth commercializing
at all in the patent term, if there is some chance that market conditions will in fact make
commercialization worthwhile.
The danger of nondevelopment thus accentuates that property rights in inventions are
fragmented over time, with the patentee owning the right only for a period of time and the public
owning the right in common thereafter. Conceivably, an auction approach could reduce the risk
of patent nondevelopment by allowing for longer patent terms. Longer terms would reduce the
extent of spillovers, and providing inventors greater incentive to invent and to perform research
and development within the scope of the patent right. A tradeoff thus inheres in adoption of
auctions: If auctions provide long patent terms, incentives to invest in research and development
increase, but so too does the social cost of monopoly pricing, deadweight loss. 50 Because
auctions can be structured in different ways, 51 this presents not only a tradeoff inherent in
switching to an auction system from a patent system, but also a tradeoff in auction design. If the
auctioned patent term is sufficiently short, deadweight loss will fall, but the remaining spillovers
might be so great that the auctioned right will increase the extent of inefficient delay and lower
social welfare.
C. Duffy on Demsetzian Auctions
Though he too does not consider the possibility that uncertainty about the benefits and
costs of developing the invention might end up resulting in effective patent terms so short that
inventors fail to develop inventions, Professor Duffy, in Rethinking the Prospect Theory of
Patents,52 does recognize the centrality of patent expiration to an assessment of the prospect
system. Indeed, Duffy argues that a consideration of patent expiration answers a central criticism
of the prospect theory, 53 that prospect patents cannot eliminate inefficient duplication of effort,
50

See generally NORDHAUS, supra note 26, at 76 (exploring this tradeoff).
See infra Part IV.
52
Duffy, supra note 19.
53
Duffy’s analysis also helped answer the second major criticism of the prospect theory, that our patent system is not a prospect
system that genuinely gives a patentee the power to control innovation, because it allows improvers to receive patents within the
claims of the granted patent. Id. at 443 n.22 (citing sources making this objection); see supra note 46 and accompanying text
(noting this objection). A true prospect system that did prevent improvements, moreover, might stifle innovation. Duffy notes
that the power of a prospect patent holder to block holders of improvement patents from using their inventions provides some
control over invention. Id. at 448. More importantly, the inevitability of patent expiration provides prospect patent holders a
continuing incentive to compete to obtain patentable improvements. Id. Thus, even under a prospect system, inventors will
compete in time to improve earlier, with the result that improvements too end up in the public domain earlier.
51
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because they instead will tend only to intensify races to obtain patents in the first place. 54 If
patents produce positive rents, those rents will be dissipated away by some form of competition.
Duffy’s observation is that competition in invention is not the only other means of dissipating
rents. Rents also can be dissipated by earlier patenting. Such early patenting, Duffy maintains, is
necessarily efficient, because it will result in the invention being placed in the public domain
sooner rather than later. 55
Duffy analogizes the patent system to a Demsetzian auction. 56 Harold Demsetz argued
that instead of regulating the price that a utility natural monopoly could charge, the government
could simply hold an auction for the right to serve as the monopolist, with the winner offering
the best package of price and quality. 57 The competition among potential utilities would result in
the winning bidder offering service relatively close to marginal cost, thus reducing deadweight
loss. 58 Similarly, potential patentees compete by offering to place the invention in the public
domain sooner, thus also reducing deadweight loss. Because the prospect system by definition
grants patents at a relatively early stage, potential patentees will begin racing early enough so
that profits during the effective patent term are just enough to cover the costs of racing. 59 In
effect, the patent system is a shortest-patent-term auction, with the patent awarded to one of the
inventors who are willing to attempt the invention first. 60 The patent system differs from a pure
shortest-patent-term auction only because the patent system does require some level of
accomplishment to obtain a patent prospect, and thus there might be a race to determine who
accomplishes the invention and thus receives the patent.
An assumption of Duffy’s model is that once one racer obtains a patent, the patent race
ends. This seemingly reasonable assumption is critical, because Duffy highlights a benefit of the
54

McFetridge & Smith, supra note 45. Later commentators suggested that the patent system might be seen as a mechanism that
seeks to reduce the sum of the inefficiencies associated with patent races and competitive development of patented inventions.
See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA . L. REV. 305, 317 (1992) (“[A] full accounting
of the effects of the patent system must balance the savings in reduced follow-on investment against the losses from accelerated
pioneering investment.”).
55
Duffy, supra note 19, at 443-44, 464-75.
56
Id. at 475-80.
57
Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & E CON. 55, 63 (1968).
58
Demsetz’s theory that natural monopolies does not necessarily depend on the government holding a centralized auction,
though a centralized auction in effect usefully facilitates collusion among buyers. Id. at 57-58 (providing a simple example
involving a natural monopoly in production of license plates).
59
Duffy, supra note 19, at 469-75 (offering a model in which inventors race to obtain a patent).
60
There may be some randomness in who obtains the patent, because an attempt to invent may or may not be successful.
Nonetheless, this does not change the fundamental conclusions of Duffy’s analysis. Id. at 480-82.
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patent system that rests on it. Duffy notes that because the issuance of a prospect patent ends the
race, it will reduce duplicative efforts. Recognizing this cost savings in advance, inventors will
race even earlier than they would have if they expected that all racers would incur costs after the
time that a prospect patent is issued, 61 and so the invention ends up in the public domain even
earlier as well. This point poses a significant problem for commentators who believe that the
competition the patent system creates is generally efficiency-enhancing. 62 Competition might
well provide extra motivation to race participants during the race, but the race might start later,
the longer potential inventors are allowed to remain in the race after it begins.
The assumption that the patent race ends might be problematic, however, because
different racers might be working on different means to the same goal, and the prospect patent
might not be broad enough to cover all of the means. Even after the prospect patent issues, other
inventors might continue their efforts, now seeking to invent around the original patent and
perhaps obtain their own patents, thus allowing them to sell produc ts or services that will be
substitutes for those of the original patentee. 63 Because Duffy ignores the possibility that patent
races might continue after a patent initially issues, he rejects the standard recommendation of
prospect theory that patents should be broad. 64 Once the possibility of inventing around is
considered, however, Duffy’s broader analysis supports broad patents. Just as the implicit patent
auction dissipates rents associated with patent auctions, so too can such auctions dissipate rents
associated with inventing around, but only if the auctioned rights are sufficiently broad.
Although Duffy’s model is an auction model, he too never considers the possibility of
issuing intellectual property rights through an explicit auction. Initially, his analysis might appear
to suggest that explicit patent auctions are unnecessary, because implicit patent auctions already
exist. The possibility of inventing around, however, suggests a significant benefit of patent
auctions relative to the existing patent system. It is relatively straightforward in a patent auction
to define rights broadly; indeed, explicit auctions will almost necessarily encompass fields of
technology rather than individual inventions. It is far more challenging for a patent system,
61

Id. at 470-72.
See supra note 9 (noting commentators’ failure to recognize the point later made by Duffy).
63
Kitch recognized the possible inefficiency of inventing around, but thought prospects might help patentees enter into
agreements with potential competitors that would help “forestall the wasteful investment.” Kitch, supra note 7, at 279. Kitch,
however, acknowledged that “the patent holder cannot offer discounts to everyone who threatens to look for a substitute.” Id.
64
Duffy, supra note 19, at 499-500.
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which grants rights based on inventive achievement, to grant rights beyond what inventors have
actually achieved. 65 Broad patents reduce spillovers, and auctions can provide breadth in the
technology dimension. Auctions providing such patents can thus increase prospective inventors’
confidence that they will be able to recoup the benefits of the research and development that the y
fund.
D. Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky on Auctioning Ideas
Although two important papers have considered the possibility that completed patents
might be auctioned, 66 no one has suggested that an auction might substitute for the patent system.
One recent paper, however, comes close to offering such a proposal. In A Marketplace for Ideas,
Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky suggest a two-tier patent system, in which someone
who generates and successfully registers an idea would receive the proceeds from an auction of
the right to further develop and patent the idea. 67 The criteria for registering an idea would be
similar to the existing standards for patentability, 68 so properly conceived, the proposal is more
akin to the two proposals for auctioning completed patents than to a suggestion that auctions
might serve as alternatives to the patent system. Nonetheless, ideas conceivably might be
developed in multiple ways, 69 and so an idea registration might be considerably broader than a
typical patented invention, making the proposal closer to the patent auctions considered here.
Moreover, the proposal furnishes a clever means of encouraging innovation, and analysis of it
highlights a common, but potentially problematic, assumption about the patent process.
65

See infra Part II.A.1.
See Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137 (1998) (suggesting an
auction that would be consummated only some of the time, with the information from the bids used the rest of the time to buy out
the patentee and place the patent into the public domain); Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power
Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 M ICH . L. REV.
985, 1031-32 (1999) (suggesting a “duopoly auction” in which the patentee would receive the revenues from an auction for a
complete license to the patent, as a way of ensuring some degree of competition within the patent system).
67
Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Marketplace for Ideas?, T EX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). Bar-Gill and
Parchomovsky also suggested that under certain circumstances, it might be optimal instead to allow anyone to develop the idea,
subject to a liability rule compulsory license regime. See id. at 18-23.
68
For example, idea registrants would have to satisfy the traditional criteria of usefulness, novelty, and nonobviousness. Id. at 31.
The inventors would also have to demonstrate “developability,” i.e. that the invention “constitutes a material contribution to the
innovative process,” and does not fit within the category of “fanciful ideas (i.e., those deemed undevelopable by a person skilled
in the technological field to which the idea belongs).” Id. at 32. Although there is substantial ambiguity about the developability
requirement, Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky make clear that it is not a high bar. See id. (“Importantly, developability is more lenient
than implementability. Ideas, as opposed to patents, need not be readily implementable. By its very nature, an idea lacks the
detail required for implementation.”).
69
Id. at 25 (considering an alternative auction design in which “developers would not bid on ideas in their entirety, but rather on
individual applications of ideas they wished to pursue”).
66
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Under Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky’s proposal, the idea would fall into the public domain
either if no one bid on the right to develop the patent, 70 or if the auction winner “failed to
produce a patent or product within a given time period, say two years.”71 The proposal reflects a
balance between two concerns. The first is that absent any protection, there will be
underproduction of ideas. 72 The second is that full- fledged patent protection for ideas creates a
bilateral monopoly between the idea holder and any potential developer that might deter the
developer from using the idea. 73 The provision of protection responds clearly to the first concern,
and the mandatory auction is intended to respond to the second.
Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky claim that the auction is superior to a property rule regime,
under which “the idea conceiver must engage in costly negotiations with a potentially large
number of developers.”74 Under a property rule regime, however, an idea registrant would
voluntarily auction a patent if an auction appeared likely to generate greater proceeds than
individualized negotiations. 75 The best defense of the mandatory auction proposal might be that
an idea registrant has an inefficient incentive to choose relatively high transactions costs
approaches of controlling the asset. The idea registrant will favor wasting a dollar of potential
surplus in bargaining to simply giving that dollar to the idea developer. If an auction genuinely
economizes on transactions costs, 76 then it might offset this inefficiency of idea patents relative
to a world in which ideas are still produced yet remain in the public domain.
70

Id. at 23-24. Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky “believe that a relatively small percentage of ideas would be picked up by
developers.” Id. at 24. This conclusion, however, depends on the additional stipulation that there would be a rule requiring some
minimum bids. Id. at 24 n.71. Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky suggest that this will prevent “idea conceivers [from] bidding token
amounts on their own ideas just to prevent them from falling into the public domain.” Id. The problem, however, is more
complicated. Someone might bid a relatively low bid to obtain the option to develop, even recognizing the small likelihood that
the option will turn out to be worth exercising. See supra Part I.C. Thus, some care must be taken in setting the appropriate level
of the minimum bid.
71
Id. at 27. Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky do not explicitly say that failure to develop would lead to development rights being
placed in the public domain. This is the most natural reading of their proposal, but they say only that the entitlement would be
“strip[ped] away.” Id. In theory, the entitlement could be reauctioned if development did not occur.
72
Id. at 10-13. Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky argue that the possibility of entering nondisclosure agreements does not solve the
problem, because of the paradox that the best legal developers will not want to risk signing nondisclosure agreements until they
know about the invention. Id. at 9.
73
Id. at 14-15.
74
Id. at 23.
75
Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky concede this point but respond that “the privately optimal auction design will generally diverge
from the socially optimal auction design.” Id. at 22 n.66. They do not, however, explain what the divergence would be, or justify
the conclusion that a one-size-fits-all auction design chosen by the government will be more socially optimal than the design
chosen by individual idea registrants.
76
Sometimes individualized negotiation might be more efficient than an auction because an auction requires all participants to
research the invention, even though at most one will win the right to develop it. But cf. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer,
Auctions Versus Negotiations, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 180 (1996) (offering a model showing that an auction generally will be more
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Even if mandatory auctions did not improve efficiency, Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky
might defend their proposal, relative to a world in which all ideas receive ordinary patents
protected by a property rule, by noting that this proposal will place more patents in the public
domain. At least some ideas will fall into the public domain because no one bids to develop
them, and others because the high bidder fails to develop them. The prospect of a rule demanding
development is intriguing, because it might counter a danger that we have already noted, that the
anticipation of patent expiration might lead patent owners not to develop their patents. 77 Their
approach is a stronger response to the risk of nondevelopment than the European approach of
allowing compulsory licenses when a patentee fails to develop an invention. 78 Even if such a rule
could be implemented, 79 however, it might not be a panacea. Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky seem to
assume that the placement of initially undeveloped ideas in the public domain at least promotes
efficiency ex post. 80 As prospect theory suggests, however, intellectual property protection might
be necessary to promote the development of an idea. The rule demanding development then must
be justified on the ground that it will succeed in promoting development, 81 not on the ground that
placing ideas that initially fall into the public domain will increase welfare.

efficient than a negotiation with one less participant).
77
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
78
For a discussion of the European approach to compulsory licensing, see Ronald E. Myrick, Influences Affecting the Licensing
of Rights in a Unitary European Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP . M EDIA & ENT. L.J. 81, 95 (1993).
79
Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky recognize the difficulty of enforcing this approach. Id. (“[V]erifying whether the development
requirement has been satisfied might be costly, perhap s prohibitively so.”). One problem is what should count as a patent or
product sufficient to avoid the invention being placed in the public domain. A firm might produce a useless patent or product
simply to avoid losing patent rights. That would not only be wasteful, but also would evade the Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky rule,
which does not require continued development after a patent or product is initially produced.
80
Others make similar assumptions. For example, Mark Lemley argues that “once an intellectual property right expires, many
companies can compete to make the good, and they will do so only so long as they can manufacture and distribute it for less
money than people will pay to buy it.” Lemley, supra note 9, at 136. Professor Lemley recognizes the counterargument that some
form of intellectual property right may be necessary to provide “adequate incentives to improve on an existing work.” Id. at 138.
He responds that in these cases, the proper response should be to provide intellectual property rights to the improver. Id. at 139.
Patents, however, may need to be developed in ways that, at least under current doctrine, are nonpatentable. See Abramowicz,
supra note 49, at 33-38 (discussing development activities that do not themselves entitle developers to additional intellectual
property protection). It is not easy to see, for example, even how a hypothetical intellectual property regime would provide a
reward to someone who markets a product without giving some right over the product itself. In a world in which some
development and improvement of patented technologies does not receive the benefit of independent intellectual property
protection, the placement of inventions into the public domain has at least the potential to harm ex post efficiency. Indeed,
Lemley concedes that there are some circumstances in which prospecting rights may be justified. See Lemley, supra note 9, at
141 (“Prospect theory is needed when control over subsequent development is a necessary part of the incentive to produce the
pioneering invention in the first place, as is arguably true with pharmaceuticals.”).
81
Such a justification may not be straightforward. A threat to deprive a would-be developer of a patent right for failure to
develop might inefficiently accelerate invention efforts. See Barzel, supra note 27 (showing that innovation may occur
inefficiently early).
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Ultimately, the aims of the Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky proposal overlap only somewhat
with the aims of patent auctions as conceived in this Article. Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky are
concerned about the provision of broad property rights in undeveloped ideas, but idea
registrations do not appear to allow for much broader scope than existing patents; a nonobvious
idea like researching nanotechnology would not count. Meanwhile, Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky
seem willing to make broad incursions into property rights in developing ideas, both in imposing
a mandatory alienation through auction requirement and a requirement that ideas be immediately
be developed. The net effect of their proposal might well be to increase spillovers and thus to
decrease research and development. The proposal might still be justified, for example if the
bilateral monopoly problem is sufficiently severe, but that concern is quite different from the one
animating both prospect theory and this Article.
It might seem at this point that the antidote is the reverse of what Parchomovsky and BarGill suggest, that patents should always be held in perpetuity and never placed in the public
domain. But this cannot be right either. We have already seen that where a patentee cannot
appropriate the full social surplus of an invention, the patentee might inefficiently delay
development of that invention. 82 And, of course, there are more familiar arguments against
infinite patent terms. Long patent terms will lead to the deadweight costs associated with
monopoly pricing, 83 as well as to transactions costs associated with finding and negotiating with
patentees. 84 The patent term auctions that Duffy suggests cannot occur, and thus cannot dissipate
rents in an efficient way, when the patent term is infinite. 85 And so, along some dimension, the
patent system must make some sacrifice – tolerating some deadweight loss, some
nondevelopment of patents, some duplicative investment. This is inevitable. It is worth
considering, however, whether a patent system based on explicit rather than implicit patent term
auctions might provide for a more appropriate balance.
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See supra Part I.A.
See F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422, 424
(1972).
84
See, e.g., WILLIAM N. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, T HE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 421 (2003)
(noting that transactions costs may provide a justification for narrowing intellectual property rights).
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Nonetheless, in the absence of exogenous shocks, Duffy’s argument suggests that we should gradually transition to a longer
and longer term. See John F. Duffy, A Minimum Optimal Patent Term (unpublished manuscript, 2004), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=354282 (visited Aug. 21, 2005) (explaining that a dynamic model of invention suggests that the
patent term should be no less than a particular length).
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II. THE UNEASY CASE FOR P ATENT RACES OVER P ATENT AUCTIONS

The patent system, we have seen, 86 bears some resemblance to an implicit auction, in
which one of the inventors who is willing to accept the shortest patent term wins the patent. This
implicit auction process provides an outlet for the dissipation of rents, reducing the inefficiencies
of patent races. But the process also presents a danger that the winner of a patent might have an
insufficient incentive to develop it, even where development would be in the public interest. The
analogy between the patent process and an auction can, of course, be taken too far. In an auction,
the right is ordinarily defined before bidding, but in the patent system, the inventive activities
that constitute the implicit bids end up defining the intellectual property right. And in an auction,
the winner is the participant with the most attractive offer, while in the patent process the winner
is the first participant to meet the requirements of patentability, even if some other inventor
hypothetically might offer the public a better deal.
These distinctions might seem inevitable, but they are not. At least in theory, it is possible
to imagine a process of granting intellectual property rights that is more akin to an auction. A
government agency, for example, might define an auction right, such as the exclusive right to
nanotechnology, or the exclusive right to a particular technology or set of technologies within the
nanotechnology field. 87 Conceivably, such auctions might be the exclusive means by which the
government granted intellectual property rights in inventions, though they also might be
complements to the existing patent process. In the latter case, the right auctioned would be
subject to existing intellectual property rights. The winner of the auction would then be granted
an exclusive right to use any inventions subsequently developed falling within the scope of the
patent right. Or, more narrowly and paralleling the approach of the existing patent system to
improvements, 88 the winner might receive only a “blocking” right to exclude subsequent
inventors.
An initial objection might be that if such a system in fact were superior to the patent
system, it would already exist. One cannot assume, however, that because a prospect system
86

See supra Part I.C.
For example, the right might be to any process providing for positional control in chemical synthesis. See Ralph C. Merkle,
Molecular Manufacturing: Adding Positional Control to Chemical Synthesis, Chemical Design Automation News, Sept./Oct.
1993, at 1, available at http://www.zyvex.com/nanotech/CDAarticle.html.
88
See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 T EX. L. REV. 989, 1000-13 (1997)
(discuss patent doctrines related to improvement patents).
87
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rather than an auction system evolves to determine rights to property, that the former is
necessarily superior. When new property rights emerge, prospecting systems are likely to
dominate auction systems regardless of their relative efficiency. Someone who stands a good
chance of winning a race for a prospect has an incentive to lobby for the establishment of a
prospect system based on a rule of first possession. 89 No one has much incentive to lobby for the
property right to be distributed through auction, since the competition of the auction would
dissipate the rent from the property to be distributed. 90 The difference is especially stark when
someone has already found a prospect. The benefits of prospecting systems will tend, especially
when new forms of property rights emerge, to be concentrated in a relatively small number of
parties who will earn positive rents, while the benefits of auctions will tend to be far more
diffuse. 91 Only when legislators expect sufficient credit from creating a more efficient system, or
a well-organized group emerges that would benefit indirectly from auctions, will distribution
through prospecting tend to give way to distribution through auction. 92
As a result, we must compare auctions to the patent system on the merits. Part of my
purpose in performing this comparison is to amplify and elaborate the intuition tha t improving on
the patent system with an auction mechanism is not straightforward. A patent auction system
must include mechanisms for identifying the socially optimal scope of individual patent rights to
be distributed, selecting the socially optimal private parties to possess the rights, and imposing
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A rule of first possession also will tend to emerge because it is easy for a court to recognize. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein,
Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA . L. REV. 1221, 1222-23 (1979). An auction regime requires some type of centralized
administrative machinery.
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The heterogeneity of potential prospectors will tend to reduce rent dissipation. See, e.g., Dean Lueck, The Rule of First
Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 J.L. & E CON. 393, 401 (1995); Wing Suen, Rationing and Rent Dissipation in the
Presence of Heterogeneous Individuals, 97 J. POL . ECON. 1384 (1989). The result is that the best situated prospectors can expect
to receive a positive rent from a prospecting system. In an auction system, the best situated party also may receive a rent. In a
second-price auction, for example, the winning bidder enjoys a rent equal to the difference between the highest and the next highest bid. See generally William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8 (1961)
(introducing the idea of a second-price sealed bid auction). Even in a first-bid auction, a party expecting to be the top bidder will
bid somewhat less than its actual valuation to ensure that it will receive some benefit from winning the auction. Thus, there may
be some incentive for well-situated potential bidders to lobby for the government to conduct an auction. Nonetheless, bidders are
likely to be less heterogeneous with respect to their valuations at auction than with respect to their expected success in
prospecting. A slight advantage in a prospecting race can lead to a large difference in the probability of victory, but only a small
difference in the amounts that the participants would bid if the right were auctioned.
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See generally M ANCUR OLSON , T HE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (noting the difficulty of organizing and mobilizing
diffuse groups, and thus the difficulty these groups have in influencing the legislative process).
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A significant reason for a legislature to enact an auction scheme is because auctions are likely to generate revenue, and thus
substitute for taxes or reduced spending in helping to balance budgets. See, e.g., Ellen P. Goodman, Digital Television and the
Allure of Auctions: The Birth and Stillbirth of DTV Legislation, 49 FED . COMM. L.J. 517 (1997) (noting the billions of dollars the
government received from spectrum auctions and observing that “the temptation to wring auction revenue from the broadcast
spectrum was intense”). Non-cash auctions are less likely to be politically appealing than cash auctions.
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on those parties socially optimal incentives to develop the rights. These are difficult analytic
problems, and the risk inherent in adopting even a system that appears likely to provide better
incentives than the patent system is high. My hunch is that, at least initially, the best explicit
auction system that even a well- motivated committee could develop would be inferior to our
existing patent system, which has benefited from evolution over time, even if the auction system
served merely as an occasional complement to the patent system. My aim, however, is not to
show that our patent system is necessarily superior to any explicit auction system that might be
devised. To the contrary, the analysis will make the case for the patent system uneasy by
identifying some potential benefits that conceivably might make even a relatively primitive
patent auction system superior to the existing system. Nonetheless, the empirical uncertainties
are such that immediate adoption of an auction system would be too risky.
Part II.A will assess the principal effect of an auction system: its allowance of more
expansive patent scope. We will assume that the patent auction system is a complement to the
patent system, and that the patent is awarded to the bidder who agrees to pay the most to the
government. At the same time, the analysis will anticipate a point in Part III, that different
auction designs could be used to respond either to concerns that a broad property right might
limit research and development or to concerns that it might increase deadweight loss. Part II.A
assumes that an auction system would be well run, but Part II.B turns to the question of whether
an auction system would be feasible to administer. It may be possib le to identify technological
areas for which the case for auctioning rights is particularly strong. Nonetheless, there is
sufficient uncertainty that government should be quite hesitant to switch to a system of patent
auctions, and thus the analysis here provides a tentative defense of patent races.
A. The Effects of an Auction System
The core of the case for an auction system is that it provides a truer realization of the
prospect approach than a patent system can. The reason is that it could allow more expansive
patents, along the dimensions of both time and technology breadth. Part II.A.1 explains how an
auction system might facilitate more expansive patents, and notes that expansiveness might limit
wasteful duplication associated with both patent races and inventing around. Part II.A.2 assesses
more generally the consequences of broad auctioned patents for invention and development
incentives and for pricing of patented products. Some of the concerns about broad patents can be
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mitigated through auction design, either to encourage greater spending on invention or to reduce
monopoly pricing. 93 Thus, the central question about a well- run auction system will turn out to be
whether the concentration of research funds in a single patentee in fact advances social welfare,
or whether there are other factors that counterbalance the benefit of decreased duplication of
effort. Part II.A.3 will argue that technological fields in which spillovers are particularly likely
present the strongest case for patent auctions.
1. Enablement of Expansive Patent Scope
a. The Time Dimension

Perhaps the most significant benefit of a patent auction is that it can provide for earlier
patent protection. The benefit of this becomes clear through the lens of the Duffy model. 94 Duffy
assumes that some fixed number of identically situated firms will participate in the patent race,95
and his model shows that these firms will start racing earlier in a prospect system because that
system reduces the cost associated with losing the race. 96 If an auction provides for patent
protection before a race even begins, the costs associated with losing the race disappear
altogether. Firms that would not be willing to start racing in pursuit of a patent for some years
might be willing to participate in an auction, because the costs of participating in and losing the
auction may be less than the costs racing to create an invention and losing the patent race. Once a
firm wins the auction, the value of research will be greater, because the firm can be confident
that it will be able to internalize the benefits of research and development. Of course, the
existence of the debate over the prospect theory suggests that a patent system may have some
flexibility in awarding patents earlier or later. A patent system, however, will need to demand
some degree of inventive achievement before a patent issues, and therefore will not be able to
limit wasteful duplication as effectively as an auction system.
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See infra Part III.
See supra Part I.C.
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Duffy, supra note 19, at 469-70 (assuming “N identical firms,” where N is exogenous to the model).
96
The provision of early patenting does introduce the danger of inefficient delay by the patentee in developing the invention. See
supra Part I.A. But, at least under some assumptions, the costs of this delay will be considerably less than the benefits of limiting
duplicative effort. See Abramowicz, supra note 49, at 20-22 (elaborating on the Duffy model by allowing the appropriability of
an invention to vary in a context in which two firms are competing for a patent).
94
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An auction system also could allow for longer patent terms, 97 reducing the spillovers
from invention. A 40- year patent term, for example, could considerably increase the benefits of
both initial research and of commercialization relative to the status quo. 98 A plausible objection is
that if long patent terms are desirable, we could implement them easily in our existing patent
system, so the auction mechanism itself adds little. But a longer patent term might be more
compatible with an auction system, for two reasons. First, in a patent system, longer nominal
patent terms do not necessarily lead to longer effective terms, as inventors will seek to obtain
patents even earlier. 99 Because an auction bid will not be stronger if it is filed earlier, this is not a
concern for an auction system. Second, a problem with long patent terms is that a “patent
thicket” attributable to many patent being under private ownership could lead to significant
transactions costs and holdout problems. 100 Yet this will be less of a concern if a single patent
covers an entire technological field, because such a patent does not by itself produce the problem
of overlapping ownership. An auction system thus makes both broad and long patents more
feasible.
b. The Technology Dimension

Explicit patent auctions might limit duplication not only by granting patent terms earlier
and perhaps for longer periods, but also by defining broader rights than the patent system.
Indeed, broader patents will be almost inevitable, since the specific inventions that will be
developed cannot be known in advance. This will help limit the ex post duplication associated
with inventing around and again provide the patentee with greater assurance of being able to
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An explicit auction system, however, could exacerbate the risk that inventions will not be commercialized. Suppose, for
example, that the government auctions a 20-year patent term in an emerging technological field, but an inventor is unlikely to be
able to develop an invention until at least 10 years of development. If the auction system is exclusive and replaces the patent
system, then the inventor will have less of a patent term than the inventor otherwise would have had, and therefore not only might
not commercialize the invention, but also might not have sufficient incentive to develop the invention in the first place. A
nonexclusive auction system that complements the patent system will not produce this risk.
98
Suppose, for example, that a patent is expected to produce $1,000 per year in profit and can be commercialized after 10 years.
Assume a 5% discount rate. With a 20-year term, the patent in present value terms will be worth $4,978. With a 30-year term, the
patent will be worth $9,909, almost double.
99
See supra Part I.C. Indeed, in a model offered by Duffy in a separate piece, longer nominal patent terms can lead inventions to
be placed in the public domain earlier, because the indirect effect of the longer patent term on date of invention can more than
compensate for the direct term length effect. See Duffy, supra note 85, at 4-5.
100
For arguments that a “patent thicket” or anticommons problem may slow innovation even in the existing patent system, see
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280
SCIENCE 698 (1998); and Arti K. Rai & Rebecca Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform & the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP . PROBS. 289 (2003).
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internalize the benefits of research and development. If there really are efficiencies to broad
patent rights, why couldn’t our existing patent system afford such rights? A partial answer is that
our patent system grants rights to claimed inventions rather than rights to scientific fields.
Presumably, the patent system could grant rights to claimed inventions and close substitutes,
with the degree of closeness possibly varying with the significance of the invention. Indeed, our
patent system arguably already does that. In theory, “pioneer inventions ” 101 are entitled to
broader protection than other patented inventions, and in particular to a broader range of
“equivalents” for elements within the patent claim. 102
The pioneer patent doctrine appears to have fallen into disuse, 103 however, and courts will
invalidate broad claims if the patent does not sufficiently enable them. 104 This doctrine could
change, but granting patent scope far beyond the invention claimed is awkward when a patent
system is based on the means to accomplishing certain results rather than on the results
themselves. It would not be difficult in an explicit auction system for the government to define a
right to any biochemical means of selectively inhibiting serotonin reuptake, or even more
broadly to any biochemical means of reducing depression. 105 But a patent system that granted
such broad rights would face very difficult questions about just how broad they should be.
How powerful must the evidence be that a drug really inhibits serotonin reuptake before
the inventor can receive the right to all drugs that might inhibit serotonin reuptake? A patent
office might not be well equipped to determine whether an invention works well. 106 Even where
an invention unmistakably works, the patent office would still face difficult assessments of
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The Supreme Court defines a “pioneer invention” as “covering a function never before performed, a wholly novel device, or
one of such novelty and importance as to mark a distinct step in the progress of the art.” Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake
Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561-62 (1898).
102
See, e.g., John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH T ECH L.J. 35, 37 (1995).
103
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA . L. REV. 1575, 1656 (2003) (“The pioneer
patent rule has not been invoked by the Federal Circuit in recent years, leading some to consider it moribund, but it provides at
least one factor to consider in deciding how broadly to apply the doctrine of equivalents.”).
104
See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854) (invalidating a claim to “all methods” for communicating with
electromagnetic waves, because the patent specification had not disclosed all methods). For a discussion of O’Reilly and related
cases, see Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 845-50.
105
This does not mean that there would not be boundary questions. For example, if the right to all antidepressant drugs were
auctioned, then the question would arise as to how a drug with some other primary purpose but also some antidepressant effects
should be treated. Conceivably, the holder of the antidepressant patent might have a blocking right to these drugs, or a
compulsory license regime might allocate profits in cases in which rights overlap.
106
Although patent law includes a utility requirement, see 35 U.S.C. § 101, the patent office and the courts have interpreted the
requirement loosely, considering scientific plausibility rather than efficacy. See, e.g., Nathan Machin, Prospective Utility: A New
Interpretation of the Utility Requirement of Section 101 of the Patent Act, 87 CAL . L. REV. 421, 426-27 (1999).
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breadth. Should an invention that has a very slight impact on serotonin reuptake earn the right to
all serotonin reuptake inhibitors or even all antidepressants? One danger is that inventors might
develop inventions that themselves have very little usefulness because they think that the
inventions will entitle them to broad patent rights to prospect for other inventions.
These considerations suggest that even if very broad patents are theoretically optimal,
decisions whether to award them will almost necessarily be subjective, thus placing great
demands on the patent office and injecting additional uncertainty into the research and
development process. A patent auction system is a system that could make broad patents
possible, if in fact they are desirable. A patent auction will be particularly useful if the optimal
patent breadth is far beyond the scope of a typical individual invention, for example extending to
an entire class of consumer goods. Once the patent office grants patents far beyond the scope of
the particular means claimed, it might as well award intellectual property rights through auctions.
Because a patent auction dissipates windfalls, it should generate less concern about arbitrarily
providing rights that are broader than the patentee has earned.
2. Effects of Expansive Patent Scope
a. Effects on Invention and Development Incentives

An advantage of patent auctions is thus that they can facilitate expansive patent scope.
That does not mean, however, that expansive patent scope indeed is desirable, even placing aside
for now the question of deadweight loss from monopoly pricing. 107 If an auctioned right is too
broad, then the pace of innovation might slow. Because a rights holder still will be unable to
appropriate the full value of the social benefits of inventions that it creates and
commercializes, 108 the auction winner might invest less in research than competitors in a patent
system would invest in total in a particular field. The auction winner’s incentives are analogous
to those of a monopolist who chooses a lower quantity and higher price than is socially optimal.
If the right auctioned were merely a blocking right, then third parties could continue to seek
improvement patents. Even then, however, the transaction costs of reaching agreements with the
auction winner, either ex ante or ex post, will discourage some innovative activity, perhaps
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See infra Part II.A.2.b.
See supra Part I.A.
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inefficiently. 109 Even if broad patents enable better coordination of inventive activity and reduce
duplication, they might produce less inventive activity overall. This analysis rehearses with some
additional nuances a standard argument that broad prospect patents might inhibit innovation by
preventing full competition. 110
We have already seen a sophisticated version of the opposing argument: A prospect
system, like an auction system, will tend to make inventions occur earlier, because competition
otherwise would reduce the expected value of participation in the inventive process. 111 That
argument is critical, because it clarifies that the debate about the prospect system is not merely
about whether patents have some benefits independent of the classical reward justification for
patents, but also about whether granting patents early effectively increases the reward to
inventive activity. It does not, however, resolve the debate, which, like many theoretical debates
in law, depends on empirical issues that might well be intractable and anyway vary from one
technological field to another. My principal point is simply that the arguments for an explicit
auction system that would allow for broader patents parallel the arguments about the prospect
approach more generally.
Clear analysis of an auction approach, however, demands that two distinct issues about
prospects be disentangled from the competing arguments and addressed separately. The first
question is whether prospects will increase the aggregate level of investment across all inve ntors.
On one hand, a broad prospect can reduce spillovers. If it would be worthwhile for a competitor
to spend a dollar when able to capture only a small percentage of the benefits of research from
that dollar, then it will also be worthwhile for the patentee to spend a dollar if able to capture a
higher percentage of the benefits of research. On the other hand, a broad patent right will mean
that a patentee might exploit only a small proportion of the possible inventions in the field,
having little incent ive to offer products that would compete with the winner’s own initial
inventions. It is possible, however, that reduced investment of this sort may increase efficiency,
because competitive markets can lead to excessive numbers of differentiated products. 112 A
109

Patentees sometimes may give away secrets through publication and obtain narrower patents, because they want to encourage
improvers to improve inventions without worrying about transactions costs. See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The
Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA . L. REV. 1857 (2003) (offering a theoretical and empirical case for this theory).
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See sources cited supra notes 9-10.
111
Duffy, supra note 19, at 470-72; supra text accompanying note 61.
112
The product differentiation literature shows that excessive entry can occur in competitive markets, because each entrant fails
to take into account the extent to which its product’s sales come at the expense of products that already exist. See, e.g., Steven C.
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patentee would still have incentives to make improvements to the extent that those improvements
will increase aggregate demand for its products, but would not have incentives to make
expensive improvements that would simply shift consumers from one product to a marginally
better one. To the extent that a prospect approach decreases the aggregate level of investment,
the investment foregone will disproportionately tend to be investment in products for which
relatively strong substitutes already exist.
The second question is whether each dollar of investment will be spent more efficiently
under competitive conditions than under centralized control. It is this issue that reveals the
linkage between wasteful duplication and inventive accomplishment. To the extent that
centralized control reduces wasteful duplication, each dollar of investment might be spent more
productively. This is not inevitable, however. Perhaps patent monopolists will allow too much
slack in their development apparatus because they will not feel competitive pressures, or perhaps
they will blind themselves to the possibility that alternative research paradigms might prove
successful. 113 These possibilities might depend in part on the structure of business organizations
that purchase patent auctions. A business organization that borrows to finance its bid in a patent
auction, for example, might feel considerable pressure from creditors both to produce results and
to consider alternative points of view. 114 Ultimately, it is on this second questio n that the wisdom
of patent auctions most turns. Changes to the auction structure can encourage increased
expenditure on research and development, 115 but if centralized control inherently is a bad
approach to distributing R&D dollars, then patent auctions are unlikely to be successful.
b. Effects on Deadweight Loss

Whatever their effect on incentives to invent, broad and long patents have a serious
drawback: an increase in deadweight loss. First, broad patents mean less competition among
substitutes, and thus higher prices. We have seen that inventing around can be socially costly,
Salop, Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, 10 BELL J. ECON. 141, 142-45 (1979) (developing a model in which excess
entry occurs); Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON.
REV. 297 (1977) (developing a model in which excess or insufficient entry can occur). To the extent that monopoly rights may
decrease the number of new inventions, that counterintuitively may enhance efficiency.
113
See, e.g., Wu, supra note 9 (offering an extended version of this argument)
114
We cannot learn much empirically about how patent auctions would work by considering the behavior of firms that have
already profited from broad patents. See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 884-908 (providing specific examples of firms
that slowed the pace of innovation after receiving patents). Inventors who have already covered research expenses many times
over might be less efficient than inventors who will need to produce phenomenal results to avoid the costs of an auction.
115
See infra Part III.A.
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because the prospect of duplicative research might delay investment in a field, but it does have
the salutary ex post consequence of reducing prices and increasing competition. Second, and
probably of somewhat lesser importance, a broad exclusive right to development in a field will
encompass even inventions in the field that in a traditional patent system might have been placed
instead in the public domain. Some inventors might place inventions into the public domain
because they hope to encourage others to improve them, 116 perhaps because the inventions are
complements to products or services of the original owner of the intellectual property right.
Others might simply be public-spirited. Explicit patent auctions might result in fewer inventive
gifts, because the winner of a right to prospect in a field would be able to prevent the gift- giving.
The concern about deadweight loss reinforces a critical point: Patent auctions do not
provide an escape from patent law’s fundamental tradeoff between static and dynamic
efficiency. 117 The case for patent auctions will be strongest for someone who is willing, at least in
some technological area, to tolerate some additional cost in static efficiency for gains in dynamic
efficiency but recognizes that the standard policy levers of patent law are too crude to make
expansive patents efficient. Nonetheless, even someone who believes that patent law errs too
much on the side of dynamic efficiency, tolerating too much monopoly pricing to justify the
improvements in incentives to invent, might endorse patent auctions. As we will see below, 118
altering the structure of the auction makes it possible for the government to alter the tradeoff
between static and dynamic efficiency. Although a significant empirical question will be what
tradeoff any particular auction structure provides, the central question is whether patent auctions
will provide more social welfare from inventions for a given cost in the form of deadweight loss.
Patent auctions might be able to accomplish this by granting broader rights across the dimensions
of technology and time, while nonetheless constraining deadweight loss by reducing patentee
power along the dimension of price. And thus, while deadweight loss must be a central
consideration in the design of a patent system and in the design of an auction system, it may be
less important than the question of whether centralizing investment resources is on balance a
benefit or a cost.
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3. The Best Case Scenario
We have so far treated the choice of whether to adopt an auction system that would
complement the patent system or rely solely on the patent system as an all-or-nothing decision.
The government, however, could sponsor an auction for only a single technological field or for a
limited number of technological fields, presumably selecting fields in which the case for the
auction system is strongest. The case will tend to be strongest when the danger of spillovers is
greatest. Thus, patent auctions might be most appropriate in nascent technological fields that will
depend on many small contributions and for which multiple patent generations of research are
likely to be needed before the most significant commercial applications materialize. In some
invent ive contexts, the first generation of research might produce as much profit per research
dollar as subsequent generations, but there are other fields in which that might not be so.
Consider, for example, nanotechnology. This field has already produced some commercial
products, such as a tennis racket composed in part of strong but light nanotubes, 119 but these are
relatively meaningless compared to what nanotech enthusiasts envision for the future. 120 It might
be that the primary social benefits of the first twenty (or more) years of nanotechnology research
will be for later innovation, 121 perhaps even mostly innovation beyond the patent term of
inventions patented in this period. Inventors might be able to appropriate only a small portion of
the social value of their inventions, and the result is that the patent system would provide
insufficient incentives to innovate. 122
Patent auctions, of course, are not the only possible solution to this problem. We have
seen, for example, that patent terms could be extended, perhaps to thirty years or fifty years, and
119

http://www.smalltimes.com/document_display.cfm?document_id=2506 (last visited June 15, 2005) (discussing the Babolat
tennis racket).
120
See, e.g., http://www.nanobot.info/ (last visited July 15, 2005) (trumpeting the possibility that “nanobots” will be able to
interact with cells in the treatment of disease); see also Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology 1-2 (Stanford Law Sch. John
M. Olin Program in Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 304, June 2005). Lemley notes that patents in nanotechnology have been
issuing at a rapid pace for a new technology. Lemley, supra, at 4-5. This suggests that the patent system may well be contributing
to incentives to innovate, but these incentives may still be suboptimal.
121
Cf. Lemley, supra note 120, at 32 (“Nanotech inventions will require substantial investment that will not be recouped for a
long time, if ever.”).
122
Another example is anti-aging research. Aubrey de Grey argues that such research might result in dramatic life extension for
mice within 20 years, and for humans within 15 to 100 years after that. See Aubrey de Grey, Timeframe for Progress in Life
Extension, http://www.gen.cam.ac.uk/sens/time.htm (last visited July 15, 2005). Perhaps this is wildly optimistic. For our
purposes, the key point is that even if scientists and entrepreneurs thought that the goal of eliminating aging might be achievable
in 50 years, relatively little private capital would be aimed directly at this goal, because of the short patent term. The field thus
advances only to the extent that it is funded through basic research or as a result of spillovers from other medical research.
Auctioning a very long patent on the envisioned anti-aging technologies could do little harm if the technologies seem unlikely to
develop in the absence of such a patent anyway.
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that one concern of such extension is that long patent terms might create a “patent thicket.” 123
Transactions costs would make it difficult or at least expensive to take advantage of the building
blocks of innovation. There is, however, an even more significant problem. Such a regime might
produce relatively little incentive to engage in the type of basic research that does not produce
patents, research that results in information rather than inventions. Inventors can keep
information as trade secrets, but in a rapidly developing field like nanotechnology, it will be
difficult to develop information that others will not also develop before some basic research can
easily be commercialized. Awarding a patent to a field like nanotechnology might have relatively
little downside, if there would otherwise be relatively few meaningful nanotechnology products
anyway. The patent system should be least controversial when it produces inventions that
otherwise would not have existed, 124 and the same should be true for patent auctions.
Such a patent might generate far greater research incentives than the existing patent
system could provide. The party that wins the patent over the field would recognize that it would
be able to appropriate benefits of the research even if those benefits did not emerge for fifty
years, and if the eventual potential payouts are sufficiently large, modern capital markets should
be able to support such long-term project development. The caveat is that potential third parties
would be less likely to engage in research, because they would need permission from the party
holding the patent over the field to market their inventions. Especially in the early years of the
patent, however, the patentee would likely be quite willing to enter into relatively favorable
agreements to encourage third parties who receive patents within the scope of the auctioned
patent grant, because the auction patentee would receive the entire benefit of any individual
invention after the patent term on that invention expired. The auction patentee might even offer
third-party improvers better deals than they would receive in the patent system alone. The
auction winner could, for example, commit not to block any patents developed in the early years
of the patent system.
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See supra note 100 and accompanying text. Lemley suggests that the patent thicket may be a greater problem in
nanotechnology than in earlier emerging technologies because of the greater number of patents, some overlapping, on building
blocks. See Lemley, supra note 120, at 20.
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Some have argued that patents should be granted only on inventions that would not have been developed in the absence of
patent law. See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 38 AM. U. L. REV.
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accelerated an invention.
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To be sure, government subsidies furnish an alternative model for generating basic
research, and such subsidies might be superior to an explicit patent auction. 125 But some critics
suggest that the government does not do an effective job in allocating scientific resources, and
scientists do not have optimal incentives to invest in projects most likely to produce long-term
welfare increases. 126 If the patent system is superior to a governmental subsidy system in
identifying projects likely to have an eventual payoff, then an explicit auction system might be
preferable to the existing regime. With sufficiently broad patent terms and long patent scope, the
auction winner will have incentives directly to sponsor research, but will ha ve strong incentives
to ensure that the research it subsidizes will in fact produce benefits for the field. Thus, even if
the model of dispersed, competitive research is indeed more efficient than patentee-directed
research, the auction patentee should have incentives to subsidize such research, recognizing that
because of its patent, it will receive much of the benefit of such research. The government could
even decide to subsidize such research if the level of private investment seems unlikely to be
adequate, for example by promising at the time of the patent auction that it will match at some
ratio research grants provided by the auction winner. This hybrid regime would combine public
support for research with control by a strongly incentivized private party.
B. Administration of an Auction System
Although the above argument suggests that patent auctions in selected fields might
increase welfare, the empirical uncertainties are sufficient to counsel at least against bold
experimentation, and because the fields in which auctions might seem most useful are emerging
fields, virtually any experimentation might turn out to be bold. Even if we could be sure
theoretically that there exist technological fields in which patent auctions would be efficient, the
question remains whether the government could do a good enough job in identifying the relevant
fields. Perhaps the most logical approach would be to create an administrative agency, but of
course that only begs the question. Part B.1 elaborates on the difficulties associated with
governmental identification of property rights to be auctioned, and Part B.2 points out that an
auction regime might be particularly problematic if the government does not act quickly enough
125

See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 84, at 306-08 (considering whether there is adequate funding for basic research
and whether patent law should protect it).
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See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Peer Review in Awarding Federal Grants in the Arts and Sciences, 9 HIGH T ECH . L.J. 1,
39-42 (1994) (critiquing the peer review system and considering the possibility of radical alternatives to peer review).
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or sets a less than optimal patent term. Finally, Part B.3 considers the cost of an auction
apparatus, suggesting that this plausibly would be a benefit of an auction system, though not
enough of a benefit to allay concerns.
1. Property Right Delineation
In a patent system, the government’s role is reactive. Officials at the patent office must
decide whether to approve patent applications, and they might insist that excessively broad
claims be removed from a patent application before approval, 127 but they do not need themselves
to draw boundaries around different patentees’ intellectual property rights. As Aditya Bamzai
has pointed out, “[a]uctions are … less useful when government policy aims to induce private
investment in the discovery of new goods, and more useful when the government has already
identified the good in question.”128 Bamzai cites intellectual property as an example of this
general point, noting that “the auction method requires that the government know what it is
auctioning off.”129 Indeed, a system of intellectual property auctions presumably would require
the government to identify, preferably with some precision, the rights that the winner of the
auction will receive. 130
For example, government officials might come to recognize that pharmaceutical
companies will soon begin experimenting with a certain class of drugs, and it might then auction
the right to the entire class of drugs. To do so, the officials would need themselves to figure out
how to define the relevant class of drugs: through a chemical definition, a functional definition
focusing on the purposes of the drugs, or some combination. The government might solicit
private input, but ultimately it would be responsible for determining when to auction intellectual
property rights and how to define those rights. The government might err in choosing the best
definition. Poor decisionmaking could lead to inefficient deployment of investment resources,
and it could lead to litigation. More troublingly, there also might be false positives or false

127

When a patentee through amendment narrows a patent application to meet the requirements of the Patent Act, the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel will limit the patentee’s ability to claim infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. See Festo
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negatives in the government’s decision about whether an intellectual property auction would be
appropriate in a given field.
If the government fails to auction an intellectual property right when it should, or
auctions off a right of inefficiently narrow scope, then little is lost, at least assuming that the
patent system continues to operate alongside a governmental auction. False positives and
excessively broad rights are of greater concern. The possibility of auctioning rights that are
considerably broader than any subsequent patent likely would be provides both the greatest
benefit and the greatest risk of patent auctions. 131 If the patent system already produces patents of
optimal breadth, then allowing the government to auction broader rights can only cause harm. If
there might be occasions in which broader patents would be appropriate, as the analysis in Part
II.A suggests, the question becomes whether the government sometimes will auction rights that
are too broad, and whether the benefits from the occasions when the government improves social
efficiency by auctioning broad rights will outweigh the costs when the government goes too far.
This is a difficult question to answer in the abstract, and one’s answer to it might well say
as much about one’s attitude about governmental competence as about the particulars of the
context. Even for optimists about governmental competence, however, governmental error must
loom as a large concern. Governmental employees of extraordinary intellect and achievement
could easily err, because the analytical question of whe n an auction should occur rests on
empirical issues of extraordinary difficulty. There are two reasons for this. First, the future
development of technological areas is difficult to anticipate; some scientific problems may prove
considerably easier or harder than policymakers currently think. An auction will be most useful
in a research context in which spillovers are relatively likely, but it may be difficult to predict in
advance whether such spillovers will occur. For example, in a particular technological field, a
line of research might yield a blockbuster patent that would allow researchers to achieve a
dominant market position in that field, suggesting that auctions will not be necessary, or many
small contributions might advance the field but in ways that will be difficult to commercialize.
Similarly, in some technological fields, patent races might produce a great deal of redundant
effort, suggesting that early property rights will be useful, while in other fields, there might be so
many independent lines of inquiry that competition will produce little wasteful duplication.
131
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Identifying the characteristics of different technological areas is no easy task, especially for
emerging technologies, where future scientific studies might change our assumptions about
market structure.
Second, the empirical economics are no easier. The case for auctions is an extension of
the prospect theory of patents, 132 but that theory remains controversial. 133 In my view, Duffy
makes a strong case for prospect theory, which at least should force critics of the theory to
advance new argument s. The essence of his theoretical argument, however, reveals the difficulty
of empirical analysis. A promise of early declaration of a winner in a patent race should lead
inventors to devote resources earlier they otherwise would (and similarly an early explicit
auction would better able inventors to recoup investments). But the theoretical model itself
cannot give us a clear sense of the magnitude of this effect, 134 or of how it compares with
countervailing effects. 135 Because patent policy is uniform, it would be difficult to measure the
extent to which the possibility of broad patent rights in fact leads to earlier and greater
commitment of resources to research and development. Thus, the frequency with which an
auction regime will beat the status quo depends on empirical issues that might be unresolvable.
Although this Article’s aim is to suggest that auctions plausibly could improve our innovation
policy, certainly too many auctions could be inefficient, and there are no tools for determining
how often auctions would be efficiency-enhancing.
2. Timing
Identification of a technological field to auction does not end the government’s task in
delineating the property right. The government must also determine the optimal length of the
right to be auctioned. Too short a patent term would increase the risk that the patent will not be
developed if research does not go as planned and might frustrate research in the interim. With
too long a patent term, future deadweight loss from patented inventions that would have been
132
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created anyway might be unnecessarily high. The project of determining the optimal term for an
explicit auction is beyond the scope of this Article, and it might well be a difficult task.
Moreover, it might be impossible to determine the optimal term in advance. Any area of
technology might develop faster or slower than originally anticipated. At least for the foreseeable
future, an explicit patent auction of this type would probably be advisable only in a technological
area in which one could be confident that little progress otherwise would be made over the
prospective patent term in the absence of an explicit auction.
As important as the issue of when the auctioned patent right should end is the issue of
when the patent auction should take place. If an auction occurs late, then it of course will not
stop the patent race; even if racers anticipate the possibility of an auction of a field after receipt
of a patent within the field, the auctioned right would exclude the scope of earlier patents and
thus have only indirect implications. 136 The troubling case is that the auction might occur after
racing has started but before a patent has issued. Potential inventors might not race because of
the concern that the race will be cancelled while in progress by the announcement of an auction,
potentially causing loss of research effort. Perhaps not all is lost for a leading inventor who loses
the auction; the inventor might win the auction or sell the research results to the winner, 137 either
directly or after completing research and seeking a patent within the scope of the auctioned
right. 138 But the value will be considerably less, and so anticipation of a possible auction will
deter racing. The welfare implications are ambiguous. The anticipation of a patent auction might
not only hinder inefficient duplicative behavior, but also delay inventive activity. The case for
explicit patent auctions might be strongest if the government makes decisions to conduct an
auctio n either early or not at all.
3. Cost
The necessity for governmental administration of the auction process might be of concern
not only because the government might make bad decisions, but also because the process itself
136
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The sale, however, might be impeded by Arrow’s Disclosure Paradox, that it is difficult to sell information without disclosing
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might itself be expensive, and yet leave many unanswered questions for further expensive
litigation. Conceivably, administrative expense might be an advantage of explicit auctions,
however. Assuming the auctioned rights will at times be broader than rights that later would be
received in a patent system, the total social cost of delineating these rights is likely to be lower.
As in all property contexts, there inevitably will arise disputes about the scope of the rights that
the government has auctioned, and if the government is not skilled at defining rights, that might
increase both the government’s costs in defining rights initially, and the costs of the courts and
private parties in litigating disputes that arise.
Auctioning broad patents, however, eliminates disputes about boundaries of patents that
otherwise would have been issued within the scope of the auctioned right. 139 The administrative
costs of auctioning a field are likely to be less than those of granting patents to each invention
that occurs within a field. This advantage of auctio ns will be considerably lessened if the auction
system is merely a complement to the patent system. Even if the auctions are only for a right to
exclude and the government continues to issue improvement patents within the scope of the
initial auctioned right, however, the number of patents issued to parties other than the auction
winner is likely to be less than if no right were originally granted. 140 The auctioning of the broad
right might deter some would-be inventors within a field, and so the number of disputes will
likely fall.
In general, awards of broad property rights have a significant downside: increased rentseeking. 141 As we have seen, however, there is relatively little incentive for potential bidders to
lobby the government to have an auction. 142 Nor is there much reason to lobby, given an auction,
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for the right to be relatively broad rather than narrow, if the auction itself is expected to dissipate
the rent either way. A well-organized consumer group might lobby, but its interests at least in
theory ought to be roughly aligned with those of the public in any event. Some rent-seeking
activity undoubtedly will occur and will have an inherent cost because not all auction
participants are equally situated, but the extreme concern of capture by private interests and
dissipation of rents in the capture process does not seem likely here. If the government makes
mistakes in running patent auctions, those mistakes are more likely to be the result of bungling
than of bad faith.
III. THE DESIGN OF P ATENT AUCTIONS

We have considered so far the most obvious approach to structuring an auction, in which
the auction winner is the party that offers to pay the government the largest amount of money for
the right. Any auction currency provides an alternative outlet for rent dissipation, thus potentially
reducing less efficient types of rent dissipation, for example from patent races and inventing
around. The choice of bid form matters, however, because the means by which the auction
dissipates rents might impact its efficiency, and the ideal currency should promote a form of rent
dissipation that promotes efficiency, given the tradeoffs of a patent system. Duffy’s analogy of
the patent system to an implicit auction in which the winner is one of the inventors who agrees to
accept the earliest patent expiration143 suggests an alternative possibility, that the government
could provide the intellectual property right to the party that agrees to accept it for the shortest
patent term. The patent term currency ensures that prospective inventors dissipate rents by
agreeing to accept shorter patent terms, thus assuring the public that monopoly pricing will not
last as long.
This cannot be a complete solution, however, because someone might bid for a zero term
(or a term just above zero). At the very least, the government would need to insist that the
winning bidder (or perhaps each bidder) pay some nontrivial amount of cash to the government
to discourage frivolous bids of excessively short terms. Even placing the possibility of such
frivolous bids, however, the inventor willing to commit the invention to the public for the longest
period of time might end up not committing as socially beneficial an invention to the public. The
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greater the concession an inventor makes to the public, the less the incentive the inventor will
have to develop inventions within the scope of the patent. Indeed, it may be desirable to use a
rather different auction currency, one that will dissipate rents not by enhancing the public
domain but by increasing the incentive of the inventor to engage in research and development.
For example, the patent might be awarded to the bidder that agrees to commit the most resources
to research and development. There is thus a fundamental tradeoff in auction design: The auction
designer can seek to limit deadweight loss, to increase incentives to invent, or some compromise
between the two, but the tradeoff nevertheless exists.
Ultimately, this tradeoff makes the case for switching to patent auctions unappealing, or
at least not unambiguously superior to the existing system. If we can be confident that the
principal problem with auctions of broad patents would be increased deadweight loss, then an
appropriate auction design could combat that problem, but if the problem instead is that
inventors will invent too little within the patent scope, that auction design will not work. In
reality, both concerns are likely to be problems to some extent, and although that is no different
from the situation in the existing patent system, it is difficult to anticipate in advance the optimal
tradeoff. Our patent system in effect is an implicit auction in which bids are paid in two
currencies, cash for prepatent investment and patent terms. This dual currency approach
produces some balance between the problems of deadweight loss and patent nondevelopment. As
the patent system moves more toward a pure prospect system in which less investment is
required to obtain a patent, inventors will register their prospect patents earlier, leading to shorter
effective patent terms. This means less deadweight loss and less research and development. An
explicit auction system might lead to a different tradeoff, but it would be impossible a priori to
establish that any particular auction design would produce a better tradeoff.
Part III.A discusses auction approaches that seek to maximize research and development.
Part III.B then considers the possibility of auctions that seek to reduce deadweight loss. In
addition to the least-patent-term auction, one can imagine other auction currencies that in effect
would force the patentee to make concessions on price in charging for patented products. A
patent might be awarded to the party that agrees to accept the lowest proportion of patent
damages, to accept compulsory licenses at the lowest proportion of what the government
determines to be fair, or to price all patented products at the lowest percentage of what
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government officials decide through a system of price regulation. In all of these cases, the
auction winner would also need to pay some fixed amount of cash, to ensure that the winner will
have some incentive to develop inventions within the patent scope.
A. Auctions to Stimulate Development
The “all cash” auction will tend to provide some assurance that the winner intends to
develop the invention within the patent scope. Just as a patentee will rarely go through the
process of creating and patenting an invention if there is no chance that the patentee will ever
commercialize the invention, 144 a bidder will not offer a large amount of cash if the bidder does
not plan to develop inventions within the patent scope. It might seem that it would be a good
strategy for Party A to win the auction and then simply wait for Party B to develop inventions
and then collect royalties through the blocking patent. But if that were so, Party B should be
willing to spend the money it would have spent on royalties in bidding on the auction. The
auctioned right should generally be worth the most to the party that expects to do the most
development in the relevant technological field.
Nonetheless, an all cash auction might depress research and development, because the
funds spent on the auction are diverted to the government. This is not entirely a social loss, for
the government can use the auction revenues to reduce taxes and to subsidize new spending.
Even if research and development produces particularly high social returns, the government
could use auction revenues to subsidize research and development in any number of ways, for
example through grants or tax subsidies. It may, however, be worthwhile for the government to
tie the funds received directly to research and development that would benefit the patentee. At
the least, this should make a patent auction system easier to enact politically (though admittedly
still not enactable in the near future). A simple approach would put the money paid by the
winning bidder in trust for the winner bidder to use in research and development. Some litigation
might result from disputes about whether spending by the winner was really within the scope of
the patent grant, but the problem is not so different from any typically encountered in trust law.
Because bidders would anticipate receiving their bids back in trust, this should dramatically
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increase the amount that bidders would offer, as well as the amount that bidders would spend in
research and development.
A significant problem with this approach is that it requires bidders to make up- front cash
commitments in uncertain technological areas. Sometimes, a techno logical area will prove a dead
end, yet the auction winner will still have an incentive to spend the funds that it already has
committed. One solution is that bidders might promise to spend an amount each year
proportional to the patent’s value that year, but this does not necessarily achieve social optimal,
because a patent might be quite valuable even once all useful research has been completed. Plus,
this approach would necessitate some means of valuing patents. 145 A simpler alternative is to
have a research subsidy auction, in which the winner is the party that agrees to accept the lowest
governmental subsidy per dollar that it commits to research spending. 146 The winner would also
have to pay some fixed amount of cash to the government, so the higher the level of this amount,
the greater the subsidy that the winning bidder will insist on. Of course, the government also
could set a fixed research subsidy, and then award the patent to the party that agrees to pay the
most cash to the government. Either way, the government might structure the auction in a way
that would lead it to expect to break even or that would leave it receiving rents from or
subsidizing the inventor. A difficulty with patent auctions is that it is difficult to calculate the
optimal level of research subsidy, though of course that problem also exists in the existing patent
system.
B. Price Auctions
1. Least Patent Term Auctions
If the explicit patent auction awards the patent to the inventor that offers the least term,
the effective patent term could be even shorter than with the patent system, especially if auctions
occur relatively early in the inventive process. By requiring that each bidder also agree to pay a
substantial fixed fee if the bidder wins the auction, then the explicit patent auctio n could result in
145
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longer patent terms, thus reducing spillovers. Long patent terms have a drawback as well,
increase in deadweight loss. Least-term auctions reduce the concern, because they ensure that
patents are placed in the public domain as fast as possible. Depending on the size of this fixed
fee, effective patent terms might still be longer with explicit least-term auctions than in a patent
system, potentially increasing deadweight loss. Effective patent terms, however, could well be
lower with explicit least-term auctions for any given level of research investment by inventors,
thus decreasing deadweight loss. One reason is that an explicit auction could, and ideally should,
take place earlier than an award of a patent, thus avoiding more duplicative activity. An explicit
auction channels rent dissipation from a patent race to the least-term auction, so the reduced
competition in racing translates to reduced patent term bids.
A more subtle reason that last-term auctions might lead to shorter effective patent terms
than the implicit auctions that Duffy describes is that explicit patent term auctions might provide
a workable approach in cases in which implicit patent term auctions cannot occur. For example,
an exogenous shock might make attractive a technological prospect that previously did not seem
worth pursuing, but it is impossible in a patent system for prospective inventors to respond to
such a shock by going back in time and beginning their inventive activity any earlier than
immediately after the shock. One particularly important form of a shock, albeit one endogenous
to the patent system, is the development of another invention, without which development of the
improvement would be impossible. “To the extent that the patent system is willing to enforce
patents on . . . new but obvious ideas,” Duffy has noted, “the unexpected development could
trigger a flood of patent applications trying to secure monopoly rights to the new but obvious
ideas that have suddenly come to have evident economic value.”147
Duffy and James Dabney have argued in a recent certiorari petition148 challenging the
Federal Circuit’s doctrine on the nonobviousness requirement 149 that such shocks provide a
strong defense of the nonobviousness requirement for patenting. 150 The case involve s a patent for
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an automobile gas pedal that combines two features of former gas pedals, adjustability (long
familiar in the art) and electronic control (previously patented but relatively new in the art).151
The race to invent the combination of these two features could not begin until the invention of
the electronic control, so rents could not be completely dissipated through a race for a shorter
patent term. Duffy and Dabney might be correct that courts should be more willing than they are
to declare such inventions obvious, thus placing them in the public domain, even where no
explicit suggestion to combine the old elements exists in the prior art. This is an imperfect
solution, however. Even an obvious invention requires money to develop, and if demand for the
invention is uncertain, third parties will be able to free ride off the information produced by the
commercialization efforts of the first inventor. Anticipating this, no one might develop the
invention immediately.
Because implicit least-term patent auctions cannot occur after the occurrence of
exogenous shocks, explicit least-term patent auctions provide an alternative means of efficiently
dissipating rents and avoiding the danger of unduly long patent terms that increase deadweight
loss. Lowering the obviousness threshold might be a less efficient approach in cases in which
inventions will need further development. This analysis suggests a relatively modest use of
explicit declining patent-term auctions. With the issuance of any new patent, the Patent and
Trademark Office could, with appropriate statutory authorization, auction the right to develop
inventions combining the newly patented invention with any previous patented invention. The
Office could hold such an auction after a request from any private party for an auction to
combine. The winning bidder would be the party willing to pay the preset fixed fee who offered
the least patent term. Of course, the winning bidder’s rights would not trump those of any party
that previously filed a patent. If there were no winning bidder, then the combination, if still
nonobvious under prevailing doctrine, would remain for a subsequent patentee to claim. 152
possibilities that can be exploited, or new needs that can be satisfied, with technological trivial combinations of existing
technology.”).
151
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2. Price Auctions
Price is the most obvious candidate for an alternative auction currency. After all, the price
criterion is a principal focus of the classic Demsetzian auction. Moreover, pricing above
marginal cost directly causes deadweight loss. Allowing the patentee to price above marginal
cost is the public’s central concession in the patent bargain, but a price auction in theory would
identify the private party that is willing to charge the least amount over marginal cost. All else
equal, it is more efficient for a patentee to make a concession equivalent to a certain amount of
money in the form of lower prices than in the form of a cash payment to the government. The
price concession reduces an economic distortion; the cash payment to the government does
not. 153 This is the flip side of the point that it is generally more efficient to raise a given sum in
taxes through the general income tax system than by imposing the tax on a single particular
product (unless an externality provides a separate justification for the tax on that product). 154
Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer have noted that a reform reducing the price that a patentee
charges below the monopoly level is particularly appealing because of what they label the
“stationarity intuition.” “Because an unconstrained patentee maximizes profits by choosing the
quantity or price that reaches a flat point – what mathematicians call a stationary point – on the
profit surface, small changes away from the profit- maximizing price or quantity will have only
second-order effects on profits,” they argue. 155 “But small decreases in price will have first-order
effects on the deadweight loss – so that reductions in price have larger impacts on welfare than
profits.”156 Ayres and Klemperer use a simple but plausible example to show “that reducing the
monopoly price by 10% might only reduce the patentee’s profits by 1%, but can reduce the
accompany the winning bid, leading to deadweight loss. The occurrence of an explicit least-patent-term auction, however,
generally makes concerns about obvious inventions less salient, because obvious inventions that require little development will
receive relatively short patent terms, and when inventions are obvious but second-mover advantages exist, some patent protection
may be optimal.
Third, would the auctioned right supersede the rights of inventors who have pending patent applications or who have
invented but have not yet filed patent applications? A particular concern is that the auction system might lead inventors to hold
off patenting until they have also patented combinations of the original invention and other inventions, lest someone else obtain
rights to the combination.
153
The cash payment to the government, however, may reduce the need for other taxes, which themselves may cause economic
distortions. See, e.g., Charles L. Ballard & Don Fullerton, Distortionary Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods, J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES, Summer 1992, at 117 (discussing the economic distortion associated with taxation). Nonetheless, this distortion is
generally thought to be less than the distortionary effect of monopoly pricing created by patents. See Michael Abramowicz,
Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VANDERBILT L. REV. 115, 201-02 (2003).
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social costs of monopoly by 19%.”157 If price auctions can lead patentees to make even slight
concessions on price, social welfare might increase by considerably more than the concessions to
the patentees.
Patent auctions that award the patent to the inventor who offers the least term also
eliminate deadweight loss. Because they eliminate deadweight loss entirely in some periods and
not at all in other periods, however, they might be less efficient than price auctions that cause
some reduction in monopoly pricing over all of a longer period of time. Indeed, Ayres and
Klemperer’s central argument is that a patent system that provides less power over price but
offers a sufficiently longer patent term to make patentees indifferent would be more efficient
than the present system. 158 That does not, however, necessarily mean that the optimal patent term
is infinite. 159 Duffy recognizes that implicit patent term auctions, unlike Demsetzian auctions, do
“not attempt to limit the patentee’s monopoly power during the term of the patent.”160 Longer
patent terms, however, would increase administrative costs, and thus a finite term is probably
superior to an infinite term in which the patentee has reduced market power. 161
Once we determine that a finite term is desirable, there is no a priori reason to conclude
that the existing patent term is too short. After all, even if the patent term were increased and the
patentee’s power over price were reduced just enough to keep the patentee’s profits the same, the
stationarity intuition would still apply, for unless the government directly regulates the prices of
products sold by the patentee, the patentee will always choose a stationary point on the profit
surface. Nonetheless, the Ayres-Klemperer intuition applies not only to the issue of patent term,
but also to the issue of patent scope. Thus, if the structure of the patent system leads to
suboptimal patent scope, 162 then it might be desirable to correct this problem with a patent
auction that provides broader scope but insists on some price concessions. Meanwhile, the
optimal patent term is probably longer with broader patents, because broader patents reduce
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transactions costs, 163 so even if the Ayres-Klemperer argument is insufficient to justify a longer
patent term in our existing system, it should be adequate to justify a longer patent term in a
system of patent auctions.
Reducing the returns to patentees will necessarily reduce the extent to which patentees
will develop their patent rights. That is so whether the returns are lowered by limiting the
number of years of the patent, by limiting power over price, or by some combination. The
problem might be less severe, though, if a given level of reduced returns is produced through a
relatively long patent term with relatively stiff price concessions. Reduced power over price
might lead patentees to delay invention or commercialization activities in many cases, 164 but not
to abandon a few altogether. With sufficiently long terms, it will likely eventually be in the
patentee’s interest to develop the invention. If the term is short, an invention might fall into the
public domain, and no one might have adequate incentives to commercialize it. 165 On balance,
the patent terms for an optimal explicit price auction would likely be considerably longer than
the current patent term, and price concessions would dissipate deadweight loss.
The patent term length is not, however, the only parameter that the government would
need to set if implementing explicit price auctions. As with an explicit patent term auction, the
winner in an explicit price auction would also need to be required to pay some fixed fee to the
government. Otherwise, someone could promise to price an invention only just above marginal
cost, and then the patentee would have virtually no incentive to develop the invention further. If
conducting an explicit price auction, the government thus must determine the appropriate fixed
fee. If the fixed fee is too high, then patentees will make only minimal concessions on price, and
deadweight loss might be even higher than in a regime of implicit patent auctions. If the fixed fee
is too low, then the risk of nondevelopment is high. Bidders would seek to obtain patents largely
for their option value, promising fabulous price concessions in the hope that demand will turn
out to be higher than expected, but then probably not delivering a product. An explicit price
auction might reduce the costs associated with the risk of reduced invention within the patent
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scope, but it does not remove the tradeoff that all patent auctions present between deadweight
loss and insufficient invention incentives.
The smooth administration of explicit price auctions is, in any event, by no means
guaranteed. The optimal design of a patent auction is not entirely straightforward even when an
intellectual property right covers an invention that corresponds to a single undifferentiated
consumer product. Such an invention could be sold to the public at a fixed price, and thus the
auction might award the patent to the party that agrees to sell the product for the lowest price. It
might, however, not be efficient for the invention to be sold at a fixed price. Price discrimination
can reduce deadweight loss, 166 and so mandating a fixed price might eliminate an efficient
practice that already partially achieves the goal of patent auctions. Thus, a more appropriate
auction design might award the intellectual property rights to the bidder who offers the lowest
maximum price. Even this might not be efficient, however, because the bid reflects only a
portion of the price schedule. Ideally, bidders might submit more elaborate price schedules, but
the informational demands of comparing the effect of different price schedules on deadweight
loss would be formidable.
The problem becomes more severe once we relax the assumption that the patent right
necessarily corresponds to a single product. We have seen that one of the principal advantages of
explicit auctions is that they might convey intellectual property rights to an entire field, so the
assumption is particularly unrealistic in the context of explicit auctions. If the field consisted of a
class of drugs, for example, then the auction might demand a bid for a single price to be applied
to each of the drugs. But that might well be inefficient, particularly if some of the drugs required
considerably more development expense than the others or if consumer demand varied
considerably from one drug to another, because it would distort the patentees’ incentives to
develop the different drugs. The problem would be even more severe if the field auctioned
encompassed a wide range of products with very different price levels. It would be especially
problematic if the primary value of patents is that they might be licensed to other firms, which
might use the licenses more or less intensively. In this case, efficiency requires individualized
pricing, which cannot easily be accomplished in advance.
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For an analysis of the relevance of price discrimination to intellectual property policy, see Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law
and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001).
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There are, however, at least three possible ways of implementing explicit price auctions
even when the products that the auction right might lead to are heterogeneous or even unknown.
The first is that a compulsory license regime might be established, with a governmental agency
determining a fair price for licensing of the patent. The auction winner would be the party that
agrees to license patents for the lowest percentage of the fair price. Most of the familiar defects
of compulsory licensing regimes are defects of this proposal as well. The government might not
be well equipped to determine the fair or efficient price at which patents should be licensed,167
and compulsory licensing likely will involve greater transactions costs than a property rule that
gives full pricing authority to the patentee. On the other hand, one defect of compulsory
licensing would be less of a problem: the danger that the licensing board might be systematically
too pro- or anti-patentee. To the extent that bias on the board’s part is anticipated, the ex ante
auction bids will adjust to correct for it.
A second approach is that a patent might be awarded to the bidder who offers to accept
the smallest proportion of patent damages. Under this approach, the patentee would not be able
to obtain injunctive relief, 168 and any damages calculated by a court in the usual way would be
discounted by the patentee’s winning bid. As Ayres and Klemperer have observed, reducing
damages is one way of reducing a patentee’s market power. 169 With reduced damages, if the
patentee attempts to charge the monopoly price, some degree of entry will likely occur, either as
a result of licensing agreements on more attractive terms than could be obtained or from
infringers who determine that some degree of infringement will be profit- maximizing given the
reduced damages. Alternatively, the patentee might simply lower prices itself as a way of
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For an empirical analysis purporting to show that compulsory licenses do not deter innovation, see Colleen Chien, Cheap
Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH .
L.J. 853 (2003). This may be an area, however, in which economic theory is more useful than tentative empirical results. If
compulsory licenses lower the return to innovation, there will be less innovation. Even if compulsory licensing does not lower the
return to innovation overall, it may change the distribution of innovation, and the case for compulsory licenses then depends on
whether the government does better than the market in determining which innovations should be pursued.
168
There are two disadvantages of eliminating injunctive relief. First, some infringers might be judgment-proof. See The
Changing Limits of Injunctive Relief, 78 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1001-02 (1965) (arguing that judgment-proof defendants may
provide one justification for injunctive relief). An antidote would be to require alleged infringers to obtain bonds ensuring that
they will be able to obtain damages. Second, in a liability rule regime, it may be more advantageous to infringe than to negotiate
whenever the infringer expects that the courts will underestimate damages or that the patentee will not be able to afford litigation.
Cf. Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Ehnanced Damages and Attorney’s Fees for Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED .
CIR. B.J. 291, 310 (2004) (noting several reasons that patentees may fail to enforce their rights). A patent regime without
injunctive relief, however, might compensate for this by imposing a small damages multiplier fixed in advance, which would
then be discounted in an explicit auction.
169
Id. at 1028-31.
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preempting competition. One way or another, reduced damages will mean lower prices and less
deadweight loss, with greater concessions on damages translating into greater concessions on
price. 170 This approach is akin to the compulsory licensing board in that the government
eventually would need to determine the damages from infringement, but such determinations
would be made ex post by courts, and in all likelihood, far more occasionally. A comparison
between the two approaches depends on the relative transactions costs of the two approaches as
well as on the institutional competence of the licensing board versus that of the courts.
A third approach is direct price regulation of the products the patentee produces, with the
winning bidder the patentee who offers to sell each product or service for the lowest multiple of
the regulated price determined by a government agency. This approach would require the
government to make the most decisions, because the other two approaches would save the
government the trouble where the patentee enters into a voluntary licensing arrangement or
settlement. It is thus likely to have the highest transactions costs. Nonetheless, it might be useful
in cases in which there are significant economies of scale in produc ing the relevant good. In such
cases, there might be a wide range of discounts that auction bidders could offer under the first
two approaches without producing even the threat of a single competitor and thus without
affecting price. If no bidder can afford to offer a discount beyond this range, then the auction
would fail to dissipate rents. A price regulation auction thus might be the only means of effecting
relatively small price concessions.
IV. SOME P ROPOSALS

Even if we accept that there are at least some contexts in which broader patent scope
might be desirable, the technical challenges of running a patent auction system are formidable.
We have seen that the government might err in deciding which rights to auction, and that the
government might fail to provide an optimal tradeoff between concerns about deadweight loss
and insufficient invention incentives in designing the structure of the auction. These problems
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A variant on this approach would be to award full damages but only with some positive probability, and the winning bidder
would be the party that offers the lowest probability. The idea that “probabilistic patents” in which enforcement occurs with less
than certainty is Ayres and Klemperer’s primary proposal. Id. at 993-1013. Conceivably, it might be more efficient than a regime
of reduced damages, if it reduced litigation cost. If that is so, however, the litigation system in general should provide for only
probabilistic enforcement of legal rights, with damages set at a multiplier of the usual damages level in the cases in which the
rights are enforced. See, e.g., David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Simple Proposal to Halve Litigation Costs (Harvard Law and
Econ. Discussion Paper No. 513, Apr. 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=729444 (offering such a proposal).
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are difficult enough in theory, but even if sound theoretical answers could be developed, interest
group pressures might well lead the government to stray from the optimal path. If patent auctions
to be practical, the government probably should not be involved in making individualized
decisions in particular contexts.
This Part considers two sets of approaches that might reduce the government’s
involvement. The less modest approach would be to add on top of patent auctions an additional
market mechanism, information markets, to assess individual auction bids. These bids could
consist of multiple concessions, including commitments to development and concessions on
price, and Part IV.A considers the possibility that governmental officials could evaluate bids case
by case before introducing the possibility of information markets. Information markets might
work in theory, and indeed if feasible could lead to an even less modest solution, legal
administration auctions, in which bidders would compete for the right to set the terms of
innovation policy and information markets would compare different proposals. It is useful to
consider these possible thought experiments, in part because the reliability of information
markets may become clearer in the future, but at this point, these proposals can only be thought
experiments. Combining two different kinds of untested market mechanisms might lead to
unpredictable results.
Part IV.B thus turns to a more modest approach, though admittedly one that is
sufficiently unfamiliar that it too could not be developed in the near future. This approach would
provide an auctio n in which only minimal governmental supervision would be required. In a
patent scope auction, an individual patentee could opt for a broader patent, along dimensions of
both technology and time, than the patent system ordinarily would provide, and the patentee
would bear the responsibility of providing a description of the broader patent protection. The
catch is that the broader protection would be auctioned, and the patentee could win the auction
only by outbidding the next highest bidder by a specified markup percentage. Patentees should
have incentives to seek broader patents only to the extent that ex post spillovers are particularly
likely. [FILL IN]
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A. Less Modest Proposal: Information Markets
1. Multiple Currency Auctions
Our analysis so far has assumed that each bid in a patent auction would consist of a
number expressed in a single “currency”: the amount of cash to be paid to the government, the
number of years of a patent term, or the price discount that the patentee will offer licensees,
infringers, or customers relative to some form of government calculation. In an auction under
one of these approaches, the other numbers are kept constant, so that, for example, in a price
auction, the government would specify in advance how much cash the winning bidder would
have to pay to the government and the number of years in the patent term. Yet it is possible to
imagine auctions with multiple currencies, in which bidders would offer some combination of
terms. For example, a bidder might agree to a ten- year patent term, promise to pay $10 million to
the government as a demonstration of its intent to develop the patent, and agree to a 10%
discount on patent damages. The government might pick the winner of a multiple currency
auction based on a formula selected ex ante or based on the totality of the bid on a case-by-case
basis, as occurs today in many government contracts auctions. 171
In principle, multiple currency auctions would allow for the government to identify the
bidder that offers the best overall deal, considering all of the factors explored in this article, such
as the risk of nondevelopment and deadweight loss, plus perhaps other factors not considered
here. Particularly if the government is to evaluate bids on a case-by-case basis, bidders would
have an incentive to offer innovative deals. For example, a bidder might commit to spending an
amount of money on development of the patent that would depend on variables such as a proxy
for anticipated consumer demand for the relevant goods or services. A bidder might even be
generous with respect to price and patent term bids, but insist that the government provide a
research grant subsidy to stimulate research in the area. The government might consider such
offers not just in the abstract, but also with reference to a bidder’s track record, so that a bidder
with a history of effective use of government funds might receive more favorable consideration.
There are two obvious problems with multiple currency auctions. The first is that the
government might not have sufficient information to identify the bid that will maximize social
171

A drawback of this approach is that it may lead to “bid protests,” in which disappointed bidders complain about the agency’s
conduct or ultimate decision. See generally David R. Hazelton, The Federal Circuit’s Emerging Role in Bid Protest Cases, 36
AM. U. L. REV. 919, 923-32 (1987) (providing an overview of the bid protest process).
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welfare. Patent policy involves subtle tradeoffs, and the magnitude of these tradeoffs is difficult
to determine. In an absence of concrete data on, as just one example, the relative costs of patent
nondevelopment and deadweight loss, government might not do a good job identifying the best
bid. On the other hand, a well- motivated government agency might be expected to do better
identifying the best bid than fixing the values for all parameters other than one, the auction
currency. This, however, points to the second problem, that the government agency might not be
well- motivated, and even if relatively immune from illicit private influence, the agency’s
decisionmaking process might promote rent-seeking activity. Although there is generally
relatively little private incentive to lobby for the government to hold an auction that will
dissipate rents, 172 given a multiple currency auction, there might be considerable incentive to
spend money to persuade the government that a particular bid is the strongest. For example, a
firm that in general can offer relatively strong bids with respect to a particular dimension or
currency might seek to influence the government to conclude that this dimension is the most
important.
A premise of the patent system is that government is not capable of efficiently making
case-by-case assessments of the worth of individual inventions. If the government could be relied
on for such a task, then we could discard the patent system altogether and introduce a system of
ex post rewards. 173 A virtue of the patent system is that the market determines the reward to each
inventor. In theory, patent auctions do not displace this virtue, because the winner of an auction
must still produce an invention that ultimately will improve consumer welfare to enjoy the
benefit of exclusivity. But as increasingly complex patent auctions place greater demands on
government officials, the line dividing the patent system from a subsidy system becomes harder
to distinguish. To avoid having to exercise too much discretion, a government interested in
implementing patent auctions might need to use a relatively simple auction protocol, for example
a cash auction or a multiple currency auction with a preestablished formula, but there are no
guarantees that any such auction will produce a better balance among competing considerations
than the existing patent system. Perhaps some simple auction design would be better than the
prospecting system that has naturally evolved and presumably gradually improved over the
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See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
On reward systems, see sources cited supra note 18.
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years, but unless that can be shown with confidence, abandoning the existing system would be
too dangerous.
The prospect of multiple currency auctions, however, might not forever be unsalvageable.
Perhaps it might be possible to devise a method by which the government might evaluate bids
without governmental officials making individualized assessment of those bids. The government
might enlist private parties to make predictions about the welfare effects of different bids. One
approach would be to create a conditional information market. A conditional information market
is akin to a securities market and is a mechanism that can be used to generate a consensus
prediction of market participants of some variable contingent on some other variable.174
Specifically, having defined a property right to be auctioned, the government might promise to
have an official estimate consumer surplus in the inventive field thirty years later. The
information market would then predict the evaluation of consumer surplus contingent on each
bidder being selected, and the auction winner would be the private party predicted to produce the
highest consumer surplus.
A full analysis of this proposal would involve questions such as whether the mechanism
might be manipulated by private parties. 175 But a preliminary literature suggests that information
markets might be quite accurate, 176 and they might provide a means of overcoming public choice
problems that might bias predictions offered by government officials. 177 The ex post consumer
surplus evaluations might be quite noisy, but as long as the biases of the eventual decisionmaker
are not known thirty years in advance, the ex ante predictions of these ex post evaluations might
nonetheless serve to identify the bid most likely to produce consumer surplus. 178
A full evaluation of information markets is beyond the scope of my analysis here, and
further experimentation with information markets might show that they would be unsuitable for
such a task. But considering the possibility of such markets is useful for two reasons. First, it
emphasizes that legal technology itself is evolving, but it is doing so very slowly, both because
174

See generally Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 952-57 (2004) (describing conditional markets and challenges in implementing them).
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See id. at 971-77; Robin Hanson et al., Information Aggregation and Manipulation in an Experimental Market, J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG . (forthcoming 2005), available at http://hanson.gmu.edu/biashelp.pdf.
176
See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 174, at 949-52 (summarizing the literature).
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Id. at 963-72 (explaining the potential usefulness of information markets in overcoming both cognitive errors and bias in
governmental predictions).
178
Id. at 1000-03 (explaining how making a prediction of a decision to be made in the future provides an approximate way of
assessing what an average decisionmaker would decide).
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legislatures are reluctant to experiment with new technologies and because many ideas for legal
technology are new. Patent auctions are a legal technology for distributing intellectual property
rights, and their efficacy might depend on whether they can incorporate a separate legal
technology, that of information markets. Second, and more importantly, the thought experiment
of using information markets to identify the best bid in a particular auction invites a more
radical, though also more interesting, possibility. Might a similar approach be used to determine
not just who will have rights in a particular technological field, but also to determine what the
rules of that field should be? The slippery slope of considering patent auctions ultimately points
to a world in which what is auctioned is not an exclusive right to invention, but an exclusive
right to determine the rules of invention and to administer the patent system.
2. Legal Administration Auctions
In contrast to the other auction proposals, the bidders in a legal administration auction
would not themselves be permitted to be inventors. In a legal administration auction, the
government would auction the right to set the rules of innovation for a particular field over a
particular period of time to the party offering to pay the most money for the right. The
government would commit to measuring social welfare produced by the innovation process
during the legal administration term. The measurement would occur at some point after the term
expired, 179 and the winning bidder would then receive some preset fraction of the estimated value
of social welfare produced. The winning bidder would be authorized to set the rules for
innovation policy. The bidder might choose to piggyback on the existing apparatus of the patent
system or to adopt another system entirely, perhaps a system of explicit patent auctions. 180 The
bidder would be able to commit by contract to a particular approach to ensure certainty for
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The measurement of social welfare would be discounted to the beginning of the legal administration term. The measurement
might also include predictions of social welfare even beyond the measurement date, also discounted to the beginning of the legal
administration term.
180
If the bidder chose to piggy -back on the patent system, the administrative costs of this system presumably would be counted
negatively in social welfare. Good faith reasonable administrative costs borne by the bidder should be reimbursed in full, though
also counted negatively in social welfare. This ensures that the bidder will have optimal incentives to bear administrative costs,
but the “good faith reasonable” caveat is necessary to prevent excessive salaries, kickbacks, and fraud. A drawback is that
determination of good faith reasonableness will require litigation, though similar legal regimes exist without prompting undue
expenditure. See generally Sherri Wasserman Goodman, Legal Dilemmas in the Weapons Acquisition Process: The Procurement
of the SSN-688 Attack Submarine, 6 YALE L. & POL ’Y REV. 393, 404-05 (1988) (discussing the difference between fixed-price
and cost-plus government contracts). Conceivably, the bidder might also be allowed to issue subsidies on the government’s
account, though here too there would have to be assurances against spending based on motives other than maximizing social
welfare.
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inventors, or it might leave itself some flexibility to change the rules as time passes on. Thus, the
winning bidder at the auction would be the party that expects to be able to be most successful at
implementing innovation policy for a particular field.
The most significant technical obstacle would be for the government to promise a
relatively accurate measurement of social welfare. 181 If the measurement of social welfare is
expected to be very noisy, then being the legal administrator would be risky, and bidders will
demand compensation for this risk by bidding an amount lower than the expected value of what
they believe they will receive from the government. The risk cost manifest in depressed auction
bids is a cost of the program, on top of any administrative costs of operating the auction system
and the innovation system. By lowering the percent of estimated social welfare that the winning
bidder eventually will receive, the government can reduce this risk cost considerably. For
example, the government might promise the legal administrator just one-thousandth of the
eventual social welfare attributable to innovation in the field. The risk cost to the legal
administrator should then be negligible relative to the amount at stake in the optimal
determination of innovation policy, and the winning bid should thus on average be close to what
the government expects to pay back to the winning bidder, allowing for a normal rate of return.
The downside of lowering this fraction is that the incentive of bidders to invest in calculating the
social welfare they can produce will decline, and thus the auction is less likely to identify the
bidder that indeed is best situated to maximize innovation. Reducing this fraction should,
however, have no effect on the winning bidder’s behavior ex post.182
Such a proposal, of course, will remain for the foreseeable future only the stuff of
political science fiction. In part, this might be because of technical complications. If the
government does not create an effective auction system, for example failing to provide sufficient
protections against side payments, 183 the system might be quite inefficient. The proposal seeks to
avoid the problems with the government setting optimal patent policy by creating a meta-auction,
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One possibility would be to use an information market to predict the result of a retrospective assessment of social welfare to
be conducted even further in the future. The advantage of this approach is that the information market will tend to average the
idiosyncratic views of different individuals who might later be selected to conduct the social welfare measurement. See supra
note 178 and source cited therein.
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This is true so long as the administrative costs of the bidder after the auction are reimbursable. See supra note 180.
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If the proportion of social welfare that the winning bidder eventually receives is relatively small, then the winning bidder
might be tempted to offer a poor innovation policy that is favorable to a particular inventor, in exchange for a payment from that
inventor. Thus, some legal apparatus is necessary to enforce a ban on such under-the-table deals.
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but this approach still leaves the government the challenge of conducting the meta-auction. That
task might be inherently easier, because the government merely needs to monitor the high bidder
rather than determine patent policy, but it is a task far less familiar than the task of running a
patent system, and thus the considerations of tradition and experience might militate even more
strongly against this proposal than against other possible patent auctions.
The more fundamental and practical problem is that we might in general not be
comfortable with allowing private parties to determine the law. At least one other article has
suggested using similar auctions as a general strategy for accomplishing a regulatory task, 184 but
such proposals have gained no political traction, presumably because they seem so fanciful. This
discomfort might be an artifact of a broader discomfort with privatization. If we have not yet
been able to align private and public incentives on more traditional tasks such as completing
government contracts, 185 perhaps we should not even try to do so on the more complex task of
determining the content of innovation law. The discomfort also might reflect an unwillingness to
conclude on the basis of a high bid that the bidder in fact is the party that will best be able to
determine the course of the law, even if the logic of auction bidding points in that direction. 186
No doubt, the winning bidder could believe that it can develop a superior system for encouraging
innovation and then prove spectacularly wrong. 187 One virtue of the approach here, however, is
that the program encourages experimentation, and it could be tried initially in just one relatively
narrow field of technical endeavor. Even if the analysis so far has suggested that the patent
system might well be superior to any form of patent auctions, the case is sufficiently empirical
that the social welfare effects of experimentation seem likely to be positive.
For now, the only experimentation with legal administration auctions that can be
accomplished will be in the form of thought experiments. And because the logical process of
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See Paul H. Rubin & Mark A. Cohen, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 YALE J. ON REG . 167, 178-89 (1985)
(describing a proposal that would allow a winning third-party bidder to supervise highway safety regulation).
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For an overview of the difficulty of developing adequate accountability and incentive mechanisms in government contracts,
see Janna J. Hansen, Note, Limits of Competition: Accountability in Government Contracting, 112 YALE L.J. 2465 (2003).
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to administer regulation. See R ICHARD H. T HALER, The Winner’s Curse, in T HE WINNER’S CURSE : PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF
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See supra notes 174-178 and accompanying text.
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seeking to improve on relatively simple designs of explicit patent auctions gradually leads to
legal administration auctions, any proposal that would grant intellectual property rights to a
noninventor might be either technically flawed or politically infeasible, or both. Thus, for the
analysis so far to have more than theoretical importance, a system of patent auctions would need
to be devised that would effect only relatively modest changes to the ordinary workings of the
patent process. Part III will suggest such a system. While this system (like virtually all law
review proposals for nontrivial changes to intellectual property or other legal regimes) is
admittedly not likely to be adopted in the short term, if adopted, it would require little
supervision from the government beyond its existing role in the patent process.
B. A More Modest Proposal: Patent Scope Auctions
The information markets approaches seek to eliminate the need for governmental
decisions about when to hold auctions by substituting a market mechanism for the government in
performing a regulatory task. An alternative approach is to give a single private party a financial
incentive to determine when to call for an auction that would provide a broader right than a
patent on any single invention. One reason that patent scope might be relatively narrow, we have
seen, 188 is that the patent office might be ill equipped to make ad hoc judgments about patent
breadth, because patent examiners have no way of determining what breadth would maximize
economic efficiency. And so patent law restricts patent breadth to the invention claimed in the
patent application, even when a broader patent might limit the wasteful duplication associated
with inventing around. The challenge is devising a mechanism that would incentivize a private
party to request an auction for a relatively broad right only in those cases in which such an
auction would produce greater social benefits than social costs.
The mechanism must provide incentives for the private party to distinguish wasteful
duplication from valuable additional inventive activity. The less the extent to which hypothetical
new products will be mere economic substitutes for existing products, the worse the case for
extended patent scope. Consider the extremes: a perfect economic substitute and an entirely
unrelated product, assuming that there are no other spillovers from the development of these
products. 189 Suppose first that the patentee has received a patent on A, but it would be possible
188
189

See supra Part II.A.1.b.
The assumption of no spillovers does not affect the case for the ultimate proposal. See infra text accompanying note 192.
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for a third party at some additional cost to develop B, a perfect substitute for A. Although B is
based on a different technology, the fact that it is a perfect substitute means that from the
perspective of consumers will be no better or worse, and cost no more or less. In this case, an
ideal patent system should extend the patent to B. The only possible benefit of B in this
hypothetical is that its existence will lower consumer prices, but if such lower prices were
desirable, those could be obtained simply by having the government auction a right to license A
to any third party (barring the A patentee from participating in the auction). 190 Whatever the
merits of such an auction, a patent system that rejects this approach, for example on the ground
that this would unduly lower the incentive to develop A in the first place, should still more
forcefully seek to stop development of B. Such development would have the same economic
effects, but would require independent development expenses that are socially wasteful.
Now suppose that C is an entirely unrelated product or technological area, whose
development and sale will have no effect on the sales of A. There might still be an argument for
awarding the patent on C to A. In effect, such an award would amount to a patent auction for C in
which the patent is awarded to the developer of A. But we are seeking a proposal more modest
than full-scale patent auctions, and in any event there seems no reason that this would be a
sensible patent auction design. Thus, we should not want to extend the patent on A to include C.
In reality, of course, very few products will ever be quite like B, but there will be a continuum of
potential product areas and technological development from B to C. While it might be very
difficult as a theoretical matter to identify the optimal cutoff, patent law ideally should award
technological areas that are quite close to B to the patentee of A, while not awarding areas that
are quite close to C. Patent law itself does not have the technology to do this, but the patentee of
A might be in a very good position to identify any technological areas that are quite close to B on
the continuum. Our mechanism will thus allow the patentee of A to call for an auction of any
technological area, but give incentives for the patentee to do this only when the technological
area is in fact quite near the B end of the continuum.
The mechanism would work as follows: A recent patentee could call for an auction of a
patent that would cover a particular technological area, though that patent would not block any
existing patents in that technological area. It would be the patentee’s responsiblility to define the
190

Ayres and Klemperer suggest the possibility of such a “duopoly auction” as a means of reducing patent pricing and thus
deadweight loss. See Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 66, at 1031-32.
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technological area to be auctioned, though the definition could be based either on technologies or
directly on economics. For example, the patentee might define the patent to cover any products
having a sufficiently high cross-elasticity of demand with its own product, and the definition
might explain how cross-elasticity would be measured. There would, however, be two significant
catches: First, the patentee who calls for the auction could win it only by paying some substantial
markup over the next highest bidder. For example, if the markup were 100%, then the patentee
could win the patent only by bidding at least twice the amount of the next highest bid. The
patentee would pay no more than the markup amount, and the auction would be a second-price
auction for all other participants, 191 so all participants will have incentives to offer honest
valuations. Second, if the patentee loses, the patentee would have to pay a substantial fine,
perhaps set at some percentage of the winning bid, and before the auction takes place, the
patentee would have to provide a bond to cover any possible such fine. A patentee will thus not
call for an auction if it expects that there is a great possibility that it will lose the auction.
This mechanism should lead the patentee to extend patent scope only to technological
areas in which inventive effort would be relatively duplicative of the effort placed into its own
invention. If there is no market overlap between a patent of the patentee and the new
technological area, then the patentee should not be expected to bid any more than a third party,
and thus if there is any markup at all, the patentee will not request an auction. Suppose, however,
that a particular technological area covers one other product, which would be a perfect substitute
for the patentee’s own product. Without the perfect substitute, the patentee can earn some rents r
from the patent, but if a competitor develops and markets the perfect substitute, the patentee and
the competitor will each earn only earn some proportion p of these rents. The patentee thus
stands to lose r(1 – p) for the extended patent right and, placing aside the danger of the penalty
for analytic simplicity, should thus be willing to bid up to this much. The competitor, meanwhile,
would bid only rp – c, where c is the cost of developing the perfect substitute. Given the
assumption that a perfect substitute does not expand the market for the product, p can be no more
than 0.5, and might be considerably lower as a result of price competition after the substitute is
introduced. Thus, the patentee’s bid will necessarily be greater than the second highest bidder, if
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all bidders are rational and have the same information. The difference will be greater, the larger
the value of c.
As a result, the patentee will have a greater incentive to call for an auction when the
relevant technological area is a relatively strong substitute for its own products, and when
technological development of these substitutes would be relatively expensive. This is precisely
what is socially optimal. Of course, whether the system produces socially optimal results
depends critically on the value of the markup. To the extent that research generally produces
spillovers, 192 even research into a perfect substitute could have some value to society. This does
not mean, however, that the auction mechanism is ill advised; rather, it means that the markup
should be relatively high. Similarly, the costs of broad patent protection, for example to
consumers, might justify a high markup, but they do not mean that the auction mechanism itself
is ill-advised. Calculating a markup percentage is beyond the scope of this Article, but the ideal
approach would be empirical. If the government were to create a program of this kind, it could
start with an extremely high markup and then evaluate the results. If too few patentees opt in, the
markup gradually could be lowered.
Patent scope auctions admittedly are but a week substitute for the patent auctions
described earlier. One of the principal advantages of full-scale patent auctions was the possibility
that property rights could be provided at a very early stage, eliminating the duplication
associated with racing and providing an additional incentive to invest early. This will not occur
with patent scope auctions, which can occur only after someone receives a patent. No one will
likely have an incentive to propose a patent scope auction in a field unrelated to a patent the
proposer already owns, because in such a case the proposer would be unlikely to be able to
outbid all others by a substantial margin. An additional consequence of this is that patent scope
auctions might not succeed in producing property rights that are as broad as is socially optimal.
Even if it would be socially optimal for a property right to cover all of a technological field,
patentees will have incentives to request patent scope auctions only for close substitutes for their
own inventions. Patent scope auctions might well cover multiple closely related products, but a
patentee would not have an incentive to select a field that has a wide range of potential
applications.
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Patent scope auctions as described here would be limited in another way: They would
only broaden patents along the dimension of technology, not also along the dimension of time. In
a separate Article, I suggest a similar scheme that could be used across the time dimension as a
means of combating the danger of patent underdevelopment. 193 Such a mechanism could be
applied also to a patent broadened across time with a patent scope auction. There are sound
reasons, however, not to combine the two dimensions into a single auction mechanism. First, the
optimal time for broadening the technology scope of a patent will usually be shortly after the
patent issues, but the optimal time for determining whether to extend a patent term might be
nearer the end of the patent term. 194 Second, the relevant markup percentages might be different,
and indeed markups should perhaps be much higher for patent scope auctions, because these are
more likely to lessen inventive activity than patent term extension auctions, which give patentees
additional incentives to invent. Third, after a patent scope auction that a third party wins, the law
would need to bar a transfer of the patent back to the proposer; otherwise, third parties would bid
as much as the proposer (less the cost of transfer), and the mechanism might not work properly.
In a patent term extension auction, by contrast, the patent should be transferable back to the
original patentee after the end of the original patent term. 195
V. CONCLUSION

The analysis of patent auctions might provide a tentative answer to a broader question of
why auction mechanisms, such as the one Demsetz proposed for natural monopoly regulation,
are not more common. Demsetz’s property rights theory can serve as a foundation for a criticism
of Demsetz’s separate auction proposal. In his most famous work, Demsetz argued that “property
rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than
the cost of internalization. ”196 The task of delineating and enforcing property rights, Demsetz
recognized, is costly. The ultimate challenge, however, is not merely to delineate and enforce
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Id. at 41 (noting the undesirability of a policy lever that must be exercised at the beginning of the patent term).
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of new technology and the opening of new markets, changes to which old property rights are poorly attuned.” Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 349 (1967).
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property rights, but to do so in a socially optimal way. Auction proposals are least likely to be
successful when it is unclear what right should be auctioned or what procedure should be used to
designate the auction winner. This point undermines Demsetz’s separate proposal for natural
monopoly auctions. Governments might not do an effective job of identifying in advance a
socially optimal set of quality requirements, and they also might not effectively compare nonprice aspects of auctions bids. 197 In intellectual property, the problem is even more severe, as the
government at least must arrive at an auction design that will ensure an appropriate balance
among concerns such as inefficient duplication of effort, nondevelopment of patents, and
deadweight loss. In government auctions that do occur, such as for spectrum rights, design
problems might be less severe.
This Article has shown that patent or natural monopoly auctions could be inferior to the
status quo, not that they necessarily will be. The status quo mechanism for distrib uting property
rights should be maintained absent a strong showing that an alternative is superior, but that does
not mean that evolutionary forces will have given us an optimal system for allocating property
rights. Demsetz’s property rights theory paid more attention to the question of when property
rights develop than to the question of the mechanism by which they develop, 198 or to the
mechanism used to distribute new property rights once recognized. 199 Property rights might tend
to evolve when such evolutio n would be efficient, but greater skepticism is appropriate in
assessing any claims that the property rights that do evolve will be distributed through an
efficient mechanism. 200 Systems that recognize property rights in prospectors such as inventors
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A principal criticism of the Demsetz approach is that it provides no means of aggregating quality and price. Richard Posner
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Richard A. Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, 3 BELL J. ECON. M GMT. SCI. 98, 115
(1972) (suggesting that this might alleviate the difficulty of determining the bid offering the best combination of price and
quality). Among the potential challenges of such a scheme is that preventing monopolists from reneging on vague quality
commitments may be difficult. See Oliver Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies—In General and with Respect
to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73, 80-82 (1976) (discussing the difficulties of ascertaining quality in a Demsetzian auction).
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See supra text accompanying notes 90-92; see also David D. Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property Rights,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. 545, 564-65 & n.51 (2002) (noting that Demsetz’s analysis leaves the possibility that because of rent seeking,
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might naturally emerge through common law decisionmaking. Evolution will leave entrenched
interests whose rents an auction system, the creation of which requires centralized action, might
dissipate. And so legislators might not adopt even an efficient auction mechanism. The
immediate task, however, is not development of legislation, but development of theory, to
establish more clearly whether relatively modest use of auctions, such as this Article’s
suggestion of patent reauctions initially with a very high markup, and perhaps later more
comprehensive approaches in discrete technological areas could improve social welfare.
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